CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.603
22 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62341/3751B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 603rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the start of our work today, I have the pleasure to welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, two distinguished colleagues who are joining our disarmament negotiating body. I am referring to the new representatives of Egypt, Ambassador Mounir Zahran, and India, Ambassador Prakash Shah. Both Ambassadors have had extensive and outstanding diplomatic careers. Ambassador Prakash Shah is certainly an old friend. He was Ambassador of India in Venezuela, where he worked very hard and left very pleasant memories. In welcoming the two distinguished representatives I would like to assure them of the close cooperation of my delegation and my own personal cooperation, within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am convinced that they, like their predecessors, will make a valuable contribution to the work we are doing.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will be putting to the Conference for decision today, once we have reached the end of the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the recommendations appearing in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I shall then invite the Conference to take note with satisfaction of the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the effective functioning of the Conference, contained in document CD/WP.410. In that context I shall read a statement relating to the participation of non-member States in our work.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Cuba, Nigeria, Hungary, Germany, Sweden, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who will do so in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, who, as Chairman of the informal consultations on the functioning of the Conference, will be presenting the relevant report, Mexico, Indonesia and France. I now call on the first speaker on my list for today, the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): For me it is a source of pride and great satisfaction to take the floor in this plenary under the presidency of a representative of our continent and the fraternal people of Venezuela. Knowing your ability and experience, I venture to state that you will lead our work towards positive results in such complex times. I do not wish to miss this opportunity to reiterate what I have already said to your predecessors concerning the positive work they have accomplished in moving our work forward and in pursuing the goals of the Conference. I should also like to welcome most warmly those colleagues who have just arrived in Geneva and extend to them the cooperation of my delegation, as well as wishing every success to those who are leaving us to take up new duties.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

Cuba, which has suffered directly and sometimes intensely the dangers of the military threat since the triumph of the revolution, has worked consciously to halt and reverse the arms race and has been, is, and will be an active protagonist in multilateral relations to achieve treaties leading to international peace and security which are fair for all. All of us as members of the Conference on Disarmament bear a great responsibility in negotiating sound and firm agreements which lead us to the elimination and destruction of the arsenals of armaments which jeopardize the very existence of mankind. In discharging such a responsibility there are priorities that we cannot forget. Rightly and in response to the clamour of mankind, it has been decided that our priority was, and is, to eliminate nuclear-weapon stockpiles and production facilities from the face of the Earth. Regrettably we must say that the danger of nuclear explosions, not only as a result of military confrontation, but equally because of technical shortcomings or negligence, continues to threaten our existence.

Some of the main and most important possessors of chemical and nuclear weapons are urging the immediate and rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. Yet it is surprising that they are not as passionate in clamouring for the rapid elimination of nuclear armaments and new armaments technologies which constitute the most serious threat for mankind. My Government considers that all our efforts must be channelled towards effective treaties to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. In that context, aware that any agreement eliminating any category of weapons will contribute to international peace and security, it believes that the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons, even though it might be a partial achievement within the context of the more complex problem of general and complete disarmament, is a step forward in the elimination of one of the categories of weapons threatening mankind. It is for that reason that the outcome of our work is a matter for constant attention in the bodies created to this end by our national authorities, which, drawing on the objectives we must reach, have taken a number of initiatives such as the dismantling of Cuban facilities that consume chemicals which will fall under the convention and a complete study of the levels of consumption and import of these chemicals.

Before expressing specific views on the "rolling text", I should like to make some general comments. We should not forget that for many years there were obstacles which delayed our negotiations for the conclusion of the convention, among them the insistence on the right to retaliation and on the retention of 2 per cent of chemical arsenals. We feel satisfied that these obstacles have now disappeared, and we would be even more satisfied if this had been the result of the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and not the outcome of bilateral agreements which we must now welcome and acknowledge, since this undoubtedly constitutes a step forward towards the conclusion of the convention. Even though we deem it important to take advantage of this situation to achieve the early conclusion of the convention, to the benefit of the security of all our peoples, we cannot accept demands that we should sacrifice the time available to us for other negotiations in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

For Cuba, a country which does not possess chemical weapons, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory convention which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons and makes the necessary provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and launching systems, is not only of crucial importance but is an essential guarantee in its perception of security. This should be a convention embracing all States which possess chemical weapons. In it all States must have equal duties and rights, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, even though, as a simple reflection of reality, those that possess them will bear certain additional obligations.

We have always held the view that we are not negotiating a treaty for horizontal non-proliferation in the field of chemical weapons, but rather a comprehensive CW disarmament treaty, and hence the text we agree should not contain any article enabling any State party, after the end of the scheduled destruction period, to have this type of weapon in its arsenals or maintain its capacity to produce them. The convention should encompass all currently existing chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, regardless of their structure and composition, and should extend to all facilities for producing and stockpiling such weapons. The future convention should not contain any provisions that could limit or restrict international trade in chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention; on the contrary, it should provide certain guarantees that it will not offer a screen for discriminatory practices based on criteria foreign to its letter and spirit. Cuba shares the views already expressed in this room that, once the convention is concluded, there should not be any additional verification machinery that could in practice establish a dual legal regime to monitor trade in chemicals for purposes permitted by the convention. Along with 18 other members of this Conference, we have sponsored the proposed amendment to paragraph 2 of article XI concerning the elimination of all current discriminatory restrictions against States parties as soon as the future convention enters into force for them.

The economic and technological development of States parties should not be adversely affected under any circumstances. Likewise, the parties to the convention should have access to assistance in the eventuality that chemical weapons are used against them or in the case of the threat of the use of such weapons. We also believe that the convention should be adopted unreservedly, as this would effectively contribute to strengthening its provisions and its moral authority.

As for the essential problem of verification, which continues to be the subject of debate, we believe that the best system of verification which can be devised cannot be perfect, and hence moderation and awareness of the context within which the system agreed is to be applied must guide our deliberations in the matter. It will be necessary to strike an appropriate balance between what is required for a reliable and effective system and what can be viable without creating a financial burden which is unnecessary, costly and may even discourage universal adherence to the convention.

(Mr. Perez Novoa, Cuba)

The different types of inspection to be devised will have to be complementary in nature; they will have to be as minimal and as non-intrusive as possible without affecting the legitimate interests of States in the field of industry. Routine inspections will have to keep to the nature of the purpose for which they were conceived and, in our view, do not require elements that might be called for by challenge inspections.

We have carefully studied all proposals submitted so far to tackle the problems connected with article IX. The team of inspectors participating in the verification system will have to be as broadly representative of the States parties as possible and on each occasion be approved by the States affected. In no case should challenge inspections be used in an indiscriminate manner by any State and they should be kept free of all political or other considerations. This is why we attach importance to the concern raised in respect of the existing possibility of abusing this type of procedure, and we believe that in one way or another this concern can and must find room in the text we agree.

In respect of the composition, functions and role to be played by the executive council, we believe that this organ will have to guarantee proper geographical representation. Its size should be representative of the membership of the convention, it should not have permanent members and all States that wish to be part of it should be elected by the Conference whilst respecting the principle of re-election of all members of the council. All countries should have a vote and their financial contribution could be apportioned on the basis of the scale of assessments established by the United Nations for its regular budget. We believe that the technical secretariat should be representative of the various countries that will or might be parties to the convention and all its posts will be open to citizens of any State party. As for the financing of the future organization, we believe that this is a very important aspect. It is our impression that delegations have a clearer idea of what the system of financing should not be than what it should be. Our delegation has identified some principles that could provide the basis for future consideration of this matter which we will be setting out in the course of these negotiations. The financing of the costs incurred as a result of routine and challenge inspections could require additional provisions, and hence the alternative solutions require further study and consideration.

We believe that in the last few months we have achieved substantial progress in negotiations on the current "rolling text" of the future convention on chemical weapons. We must recall that this negotiating process has been and is the result of negotiations among the members of the Conference on Disarmament and that most countries - which we hope will sign the convention so that it enjoys universal participation - are not aware of this text. Hence we supported the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the President of the Conference on Disarmament to the Member States of the United Nations, drawing their

attention to the forthcoming conclusion of the negotiating process on the convention, and we promoted the idea of informing the permanent representatives of our region which are not members of the Conference of the specific features of the evolving text. However, we consider that this is not enough given the imminence of the early conclusion of the convention and our interest in its gaining maximum participation. We suggest that the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament should immediately initiate a wide-ranging process of information and clarification for the benefit of permanent representatives of Governments which are non-members of the Conference on Disarmament on the "rolling text" of the convention so as to enable them to sign the convention immediately once it is concluded.

Allow me in conclusion to reiterate that it is our most heartfelt desire that the impetus currently enjoyed by the negotiations on chemical weapons, after long years of stagnation, should not only be crowned by success as soon as possible, but also that it should extend sooner rather than later to all the other items on the agenda of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you presiding over our work, the representative of a country with which Nigeria has excellent relations. Although this is a crucial period of our session, my delegation is confident that you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would like to take this opportunity to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar for his significant contributions during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. May I use this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours? I would also like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is only natural that we take stock of our efforts and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. The first part of my statement this morning will be devoted to chemical weapons. We find most encouraging the positive spirit of cooperation that has generally prevailed in the negotiations. Already, both the United States and the Soviet Union had last year reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes the timely initiative of the United States in resolving the two key issues that had created obstacles to our negotiations in the past. We note with satisfaction their unconditional commitment to the destruction of all their chemical weapons stocks and facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. We believe that this willingness to accommodate differing views is a hopeful sign towards resolving other thorny issues in the "rolling text".

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The endeavour to complete our work should, however, not blind us to present-day realities. The final phase of our work will require careful and coordinated efforts by all delegations to ensure its consolidation through agreement on the few outstanding issues. We must demonstrate the vision and tenacity that the opportunity requires and identify practical, forward-looking ways towards an early conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction.

Despite apparent repetition, we find it essential to emphasize that Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire them. Notwithstanding that our chemical industry is still in its infancy, my Government earlier last month held a national seminar on the future of chemical weapons. The importance that my country attaches to the convention is motivated by our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In short, the convention must be economically neutral.

Our principal concern still remains that the proposed ban and restrictions would seriously affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, protracted delays and escalation in their prices. Related equipment could be similarly affected. These are very real concerns, and I believe that we are not negotiating a convention that would paralyse the chemical industry of States parties, especially from the developing countries. Such a perception would have dire consequences for universality. Hence we believe that all existing export control measures in the chemical industry must be abolished when the convention enters into force. Obviously, steps must be taken to allay such fears.

We welcome the agreement reached during the inter-sessional meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to include the articles on assistance and protection, and on economic and technological development, as well as a new article on sanctions, in the "rolling text". This augurs well for the early conclusion of the convention. The importance that we attach to these articles arises from our belief that the convention should help to foster friendly relations among its adherence through cooperation in chemical industry. It should also provide a framework, in addition to other international mechanisms, to develop close ties through the demonstration of solidarity among States parties in times of crisis. Articles X and XI, and that on sanctions, have these potentialities and their provisions must be positively elaborated so that the potentialities can be fully realized.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Specifically on the issue of sanctions, my delegation last year advocated the provision of penalties for the violation of the convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the record of imposition of sanctions is mixed at best, its inclusion in the convention could enhance universal adherence. For a developing country like Nigeria, the creation of awareness that the use of chemical weapons would not be cost-free, through a commitment to sanctions by the States parties, would deter aggression by non-States parties.

The burden of creating a credible sanctions policy as a reprisal against the use of chemical weapons will no doubt fall on the executive council acting under appropriate supervision of the Security Council as outlined by Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his plenary statement on 8 August. My delegation is mindful of the difficult legal problem of trying to legitimize sanctions against non-States parties to the future convention. However, we regard them as measures that are indispensable for the undiminished security of States parties.

It would be exceedingly myopic to believe or think that the benefits of these articles will flow only to the States parties from the developing countries. As we are living in an interdependent world, all efforts must be made to ensure that the convention is as attractive as possible in order to attain the widest possible adherence.

Another unresolved key issue is verification, both routine and challenge, which remains very difficult. We must continue to address it very constructively, and with perseverance. We regard routine inspection as a purely technical exercise which should be left to the technical secretariat to conduct. Only this approach can guarantee a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory system. Challenge inspection is qualitatively different. Firstly, it is initiated by a State party. Secondly, it is intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This aspect of the inspection, together with the special interest it is bound to generate among States parties, gives it a specifically political and therefore very sensitive character. It bears repeating that the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. Thus it can only be expected that after the organization has completed its inspection of the State party's facility, the same organization should make a categorical pronouncement on the State party's compliance or not, on the basis of the inspection report. It should be a collective exercise, from the beginning to the end, especially in view of its political nature. We trust that this important aspect of the issue and of course the level of intrusiveness or the role of the observer will continue to receive careful consideration.

History has repeatedly demonstrated the fact that we cannot really enforce or legislate morality. We all know that good intention is one thing and honest implementation is quite another irrespective of whether the selection of facilities for inspection is done by the technical secretariat or States parties.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

I should now like to take up the question of nuclear disarmament which constitutes priority items on our agenda. The trend within recent years has been moving towards an era of pragmatic cooperation among States. Most importantly, the climate for consideration of disarmament matters has certainly improved. This evolution, the absence of which hitherto had provided a ready excuse for lack of progress in the disarmament process has since resulted in the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Last month witnessed another historic occasion when the two countries concluded the START agreement on cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons.

Although there are major challenges ahead, the two nuclear-weapon States must strive to maintain the momentum as there is no room for complacency. We cannot afford the resurgence of old tensions. The strategic arms control agenda is far from exhausted. START is just the beginning of a continuous process towards nuclear disarmament. There is much we can learn from the implementation of the INF Treaty. Its value lies in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. We should however bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the bilateral negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is against this background that we call on the Conference to take such measures that will lead to immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on the nuclear test ban as a matter of priority. We look forward to the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate at the next session.

Recently a number of countries including South Africa signed the non-proliferation Treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States, France and China have announced their intention in principle to accede to the Treaty. This augurs well for the NPT which has served as the most important international agreement limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. We heartily welcome them to our fold. The growing support will no doubt further strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Although these developments are a welcome step in the right direction, there are still serious concerns to be addressed. Within my region Africa, the crucial question still relates to the IAEA's safeguards of all South Africa's nuclear facilities, or highly enriched uranium in its possession. Furthermore, there is the reality of the existence of some nuclear weapons it has already produced, tested and possibly deployed. Nigeria attaches immense importance to the effectiveness of the safeguards system, which should be strengthened and the existing loopholes blocked. To do otherwise would undermine the non-proliferation regime.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Tóth.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the post of President in this very important and concluding phase of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me add that I do not envy you in fulfilling your difficult task, but my delegation is prepared to give you all of its support in your undertaking. I would like to join in your words of welcome extended to our newly arrived colleagues, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India.

The recent events in the Soviet Union caused alarm and anxiety all over the world. The abortive coup d'état was a direct assault on an unfolding democracy. My country is extremely relieved and happy to note the positive turn of events and the restoration of the constitutional power in Moscow. Hopefully, with this positive development, the fears of a shadow creeping over international disarmament efforts will be removed as well.

After years of strenuous negotiations a major disarmament agreement affecting the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States was signed at the Moscow summit meeting held a couple of weeks ago. The envisaged reduction by some 30 per cent of the offensive arsenals will undoubtedly contribute to the creation of a more secure and stable world and to paving the way for further steps in the nuclear field, particularly in eliminating short-range nuclear forces.

Other events of this year so far had a complex impact on our proceedings. Perhaps the most significant influence can be attributed to the Gulf conflict, to the lingering threat of the use of chemical weapons in the war. Expectations concerning the outcome of the conflict and the possible terms of its settlement had a discernible effect on the negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, leading to meaningful work on pending issues of the future chemical weapons convention.

No less importance can be attached to the arms control and disarmament initiatives that were launched following the ending of the Gulf crisis. The chemical weapons initiative of the United States President, the new arms control and disarmament plan put forward by the President of France are major developments. Important steps were also made towards achieving the universality of the NPT, including the announcement of the decision in principle of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

The re-evaluation by the United States of security policy related to chemical weapons has had an immense effect on the CW negotiations. We certainly add our voice to the numerous appraisals expressed in this hall regarding the decision announced by President Bush a couple of months ago to move away from a position previously held concerning the conditional destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons. That initiative marked a genuine intent to conclude a

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and led to the creation of the favourable atmosphere in which the negotiations are now progressing. The Hungarian delegation cannot but welcome the plans to intensify the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allocating as much time as possible for substantive work in order to meet the objective adopted in the new mandate of the Committee. We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, seeking to find additional time for negotiations without the intention of interfering with other no less important events of multilateral disarmament. We do believe that some kind of activity, apart from a full session of the Committee, is possible even during periods coinciding with the work of other disarmament forums. In this regard, consideration might also be given to making good use of the presence at the United Nations General Assembly of high-level political decision makers. Their gathering in New York could be exploited for giving additional political support or impetus to the CW negotiations.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly later this fall will reflect the results achieved so far in the CW negotiations. The achievements will duly represent the current state of affairs in the negotiations and will - in a way - also indicate the fields requiring further work for concluding the CW convention. One such field is of course verification which, by nature, is one of the crucial elements of any arms control or disarmament agreement. During this year's session important new approaches have been injected into the work on the verification regime to be applied to activities not prohibited under the convention. We attach equal importance to the fact that after a period of stalling, substantive discussion in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee was resumed on the other element of the future verification system, namely, challenge inspection. The latter was substantiated not least by new ideas presented by a number of delegations giving ample material to work on with the aim of resolving the issue. The intensification of work on the verification system to be created under article VI of the draft convention was a result of the common recognition that existing provisions on the verification of activities not prohibited under the convention are far from satisfactory. We welcome the new approaches aiming to integrate the major and most relevant part of the international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. They all appear to seek some sort of solution to eliminate existing loopholes. It is also encouraging that the chemical industry is ready to provide access to all of its facilities for the main purposes of verification.

When we attempt to patch up the holes of the safety net identified with the verification system we should not overlook the imperfections that exist elsewhere. I would like to refer to the schedules of chemicals that are to play a fundamental part in conducting inspections. It is obvious that the contents of the schedules will determine to a large extent the scope of any inspection to be carried out in the future. Now, for example, as we look at schedule 1, listing chemicals known to be chemical weapons, we may have to

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

face the fact that certain chemicals publicly described as possible agents for warfare are missing from our list. Also, there is good reason to presume that declared chemical-weapon States and other States known to have displayed "interest" towards this means of warfare might be in the possession of CW formulas that have not been made public so far. Thus, the danger of circumvention is inherent. Of course, it is hard to imagine any method to deal with the latter phenomenon. Yet we must be aware of certain facts of life if we are to maintain our clearsightedness.

While there is an unquestionable need to have an adequate regime to make sure that chemical industries of future States parties are really engaged only in activities not prohibited under the convention, we should be realistic in our final objectives. It should have become obvious by now that a truly foolproof verification regime of the chemical weapons convention would entail financial and other burdens that most future parties would be reluctant to bear. However, a trade-off between possibilities and the safeguarding of implementation is indispensable. In our view, the verification system can be considerably strengthened by an enhanced challenge regime providing increased effectiveness relating, in particular, to facilities declared under article VI of the future convention.

It has often been said that one of the main purposes of verification is to detect non-compliance and through this, to deter potential violators. At the same time, realizing the limitations of any workable and feasible verification system for the chemical weapons convention, we might look at other ways as well to enhance the deterrence against possible violators. It is obvious that verification has the best chance to reveal a violation arising from the actual use of chemical weapons. This form of violation was also considered by the initiative put forward by President Bush as a grave breach of international law, and I do not believe that anybody in this hall thinks otherwise. Accepting this as a premise, the international community should have the resolve to take appropriate and determined action against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. This action, of course, would mean sanctions in the first place. The terms of the cease-fire putting an end to the Gulf conflict as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 established stringent rules and conditions for the vanquished and have provided an important precedent. Such terms in themselves could also become a form of dissuasion to any future aggressor or violator. It could also effectively complement the deterrent potential of verification expected to detect non-compliance. Thus, it might be advisable to take another look at provisions on "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions" that have recently been introduced into the draft convention.

There is one more issue that cannot be avoided when discussing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that surely is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We regard the CWC as replacing totally, for States parties, the obligations and rights assumed

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

under the Geneva Protocol. In accepting the spirit and the substance of the CWC, there remains no sound reason to maintain reservations attached by certain States to the Protocol. We certainly endorse the call to withdraw all reservations to the Geneva Protocol upon signature of the CW convention, at the latest. We welcome the decision by a number of States parties to the Geneva Protocol to withdraw their reservations.

Hungary has, on earlier occasions, stated that States parties to the CW convention, while assuming significant obligations, cannot be entitled to merely the same rights that non-States parties without obligations might enjoy. In this regard, the CW convention really needs to be positively discriminatory vis-à-vis States parties. Discrimination that might arise from the future CWC is to be exercised towards States failing to join the convention. If universal adherence to the future convention is a desired objective, this certainly must be kept in mind. We are, of course, aware of the existence of certain arrangements aiming to curb the actual threat of CW proliferation. Such arrangements have indeed contributed to non-proliferation efforts. However, with the achievement of the total and comprehensive ban of chemical weapons through the CW convention, these measures - being a product of a totally different situation - need to be re-examined and should be harmonized with the purposes of the convention.

The recent progress in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, and the expected completion of these negotiations by 1992, will also affect the third review conference of the biological weapons Convention. May I just recall the often heard expectation that a well-founded CWC might pave the way for the more effective functioning of the biological weapons Convention? This is not the first occasion during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament when the topic of biological weapons appears in a statement. In the framework of our informal consultations on the future of the CD, several delegations raised the possibility of conducting meaningful negotiations to establish a verification mechanism in this field. The arms control and disarmament plan introduced by the distinguished Ambassador of France on 3 June also contained a concrete proposal on the verification of the 1972 biological weapons Convention.

In our view, the question of an ensured prohibition of biological weapons is gathering increasing importance. The recent findings of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq have caused a frightening alarm that the grave danger of biological warfare has not yet disappeared. It is our firm belief that the BWC is of crucial significance, making an undeniable and relevant contribution to international security. The system of confidence-building measures adopted at the 1987 follow-up technical meeting also played a useful role in strengthening the Convention. These positive facts, however, should not tempt us to sit back comfortably and enjoy a false feeling of satisfaction.

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

Important lessons have to be drawn from the functioning of the confidence-building system. Some of its elements need strengthened and widened scope, while the effectiveness of others is yet to be proven. A major task ahead of the Conference lies in modifying the actual modalities of the confidence-building system. In this respect, it seems inevitable to widen the scope and increase the number of involved facilities on the one hand, and concentrate the reporting on relevant and significant information on the other. The scope of the CBMs should also be wider with regard to the defence-related activities permitted under the Convention, and also to such activities that might carry an indirect danger for humankind, e.g. through damaging the environment. Another important problem is data-processing - or rather its present absence. The structure of the reports has to be modified in a way so that it would open the possibility of computerized analysis. Access to this database should be provided for all States parties. As for the future steps in the field of confidence-building, it might be advisable to establish the basis of direct communication methods between the facilities that were actually accounted for in the yearly report.

It might also be advisable to assess the present approach to the confidence-building measures and reaffirm the political commitment undertaken for participating in these measures. Another important responsibility of the review conference lies in strengthening the character of the convention as an instrument of non-proliferation, without of course changing the basic principles regarding commercial relations and scientific cooperation.

In the light of the fresh evidence that one of the signatries to the BWC conducted a biological warfare programme, the question of verification cannot be considered any more as only a theoretical one. On the contrary, this problem seems to be more topical than ever before. One of the most important and probably most difficult tasks ahead of the third review conference is to lay the groundwork for the further consideration of the establishment of a future verification system of the BWC.

Naturally, a relatively short conference cannot cover the whole problem of verification in its entirety and complexity. One possible solution is to concentrate our efforts on questions of principle and leave the practical details to a new follow-up process. It is evident that any kind of follow-up will have to face a laborious task, where a great deal of detailed technical work is to be accomplished. In the light of this, we think that such a process should not necessarily be tied to a rigid time frame. The primary nature of such a follow-up will probably have to be an exploratory one. We must not forget that verification of the BWC constitutes a very specific task, and it may easily turn out to be even more difficult than that of the CWC. As an introductory measure to further negotiations, possible approaches have to be defined and examined from the points of view of practicability, effectiveness and costs.

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

The Gulf conflict and its aftermath have consequences that go far beyond ongoing multilateral disarmament efforts. The activities carried out and the findings made by the United Nations Special Commission established to implement the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 687 have a clear message to convey to the international community as a whole. Clandestine and overt attempts at proliferation, excessive conventional arms build-up having nothing to do with the needs of legitimate self-defense, have displayed vividly their extremely destabilizing effects for international security. There appear to be discrepancies between the existing, but by no means comprehensive multilateral disarmament machinery, including its legal instruments on the one hand and the revealed facts of reality on the other. Unfortunately, the problems have surfaced in areas where there was an apparent feeling of security. Uncertainties have arisen regarding the effectiveness of multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes established in the field of weapons of mass destruction. This realization might call for reflection on the effectiveness of some of the relevant aspects of existing security and disarmament treaties and other corresponding arrangements.

There is currently an important and welcome political driving force to finalize the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Such an influence is indispensable for the conclusion of any disarmament agreement. However, we must not forget the lessons of the Gulf conflict I have just referred to, namely that some uncertainties have arisen regarding existing multilateral disarmament agreements. It surely cannot be denied that those agreements were concluded on the basis of what could then be politically achieved, yet practice appears to have defied some of the objectives. This, in our view, needs to be taken into account while working on new agreements in order to avoid future "disappointments" in matters related to international security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)(translated from Spanish): Mr. President, a week ago you took up your very important task of President of this Conference. We wish you every success. There is no doubt that you are highly qualified to guide us in our deliberations in the most effective manner. As your presidency will be the last in this year's session, it will cover the most important stage in the negotiations, right up until the initial weeks of next year. Under your presidency we can be sure that we will attain the lofty goals to which we aspire.

(continued in English)

Before introducing the reports on two trial challenge inspections conducted in Germany earlier this year, I would like to start with some observations on this issue in general. In the past our work on the CW convention has been criticized repeatedly from outside the CD, pointing to

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

our distance from reality in our negotiations at the detached conference table. Although critics might not be wrong in some respects, it is not true as to verification exercises. Up to now, we have a record of approximately 50 trial routine and trial challenge inspections, carried out by various CD members and observer countries in the past few years. This gives evidence of a solid, still growing practical basis and a wealth of operational experience available to us in concluding, at last, our work on the CW convention.

Some countries, including my own, have also reported on bilateral trial challenge inspections, which not only added further elements of realism to a learning process in very practical terms, but at the same time served in building confidence between the countries involved. In this context, my delegation wishes to express its particular appreciation of the interesting joint report tabled recently by the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union in document CD/1093.

Within the framework of a series of German trial challenge inspections, such an inspection was conducted for the first time at a large chemical complex at the end of February 1991. Another trial challenge inspection was conducted with participants from five other CD countries at a German air force base in May 1991. I have pleasure in introducing today the reports on these two trial challenge inspections, which are tabled as documents CD/1101 and CD/1102 (working papers CD/CW/WP.360 and CD/CW/WP.361).

In order to gain, for the first time, experience in the inspection of a large production site typical of the German chemical industry, a plant site located in Frankfurt-Hoechst was selected, comprising approximatey 800 buildings and 100 individual production facilities, covering an area of over 4 square kilometres. Document CD/1101 describes in detail the scenario, the conduct of the inspection and the lessons learned. Above all, this trial inspection showed that a suspected violation of article I of the convention can be investigated successfully even in the case of a very large chemical plant site. Nevertheless, the suspicion needs to be sufficiently concrete and specified in the request. In this case, the suspected production of the schedule 1 precursor chemical DF was investgated. Another important lesson learned refers to the requirement of inspectors to be specially trained to perform such a difficult inspection task in the chemical industry. Expertise not only in chemical processes, including processes possibly used in CW production, but also in chemical engineering and plant construction, was found to be absolutely crucial. This similarly applies to the members of the escort team of the national authority.

As regards the size of the inspection team, 11 inspectors split up into four subteams were able to inspect less than a third of the facilities within the two days of trial inspection. To facilitate their task, a number of inspection assistants were found to be needed. These assistants should be assigned to each subteam to carry out, for example, sample-taking and analytical screening.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The inspection excluded the aspect of securing the site. Since securing a site of this size in a meaningful manner poses major problems, it had been decided not to overload the scenario of this first trial challenge inspection of such a site.

Basically, the trial inspection caused no problems regarding commercial confidentiality. However, it was felt that this aspect could not be enacted in a sufficiently realistic manner, given the artificial absence of real distrust in the case of this exercise. Nevertheless, the area of applied research, which represents the stage between research and production, was identified to be a particularly sensitive one: the information that could have been collected here is of extraordinary commercial value to the owner and, therefore, requires special protection. With regard to the observer, there was no indication that his role would differ from that at military facilities. In both cases he should be kept informed on how the inspection was proceeding by the chief inspector only, while it should be at the discretion of the challenged State to determine the extent of access granted to him. The observer's rights need to be clearly delimited further.

Finally, sampling and analysis proved to be particularly difficult tasks. The necessity of further development of methods and instrumentation, identified previously by the technical groups chaired by Dr. Rautio, was confirmed during this exercise. Both the number of samples and the time required for analysis need to be reduced drastically. Methods to be developed should include simple pre-screening means backed up by more sophisticated screening methods, such as recently proposed by Australia in CD/CW/WP.353. Thus, more intrusive and time-consuming in-depth analyses of samples on the site would be minimized. The use of analytical instruments of the central laboratory at the site proved to be problematic, since they took considerable time to be adapted to the needs of the inspection.

Some of the experiences I have mentioned were confirmed during the first trial challenge inspection with multinational participation and are described in detail in document CD/1102. The inspection at the Bad Kreuznach military air base, consisting of two distant areas, proceeded from the suspicion of chemical weapons being stored and personnel being trained in the use of these weapons. One of the aims in this trial inspection was to gain practical experience with an international inspection team typical of those that will be dispatched by the future technical secretariat. The inspectors, who came from Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Germany, worked extremely well together. From time to time, the course of the inspection was interrupted to discuss questions raised by team members participating in a CW-related inspection for the first time. These discussions turned out to be of great value to all participants. The need for the inspectors appointed by the technical secretariat to be thoroughly prepared and well trained again became clear.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The observer in this trial inspection, whose role was assumed by the United Kingdom, was accorded a high degree of openness, although, like the observer in previous German trial challenge inspections, he was constantly escorted. In some cases, at the request of the representative of the inspection site, he was kept at a safe distance from the inspected sensitive object.

Finally, returning to the point of the criticism of the work done in the CD, namely to be lacking the necessary sense of reality, let me add one practical proposal that builds on practical experience: in order to narrow down, in the future, the unavoidable gap between inspection exercises and real inspections, CW dummies could be hidden at the inspection site, with the task for the site management not to disclose their existence and to attempt to evacuate them in spite of the site being secured.

All in all, apart from many other lessons learned, it can be concluded from this first multinational trial challenge inspection that the challenge inspection regime envisaged can fully meet the requirements as an important verification instrument of the CW convention. It can be handled in such a way as to ensure the necessary degree of openness, while taking into account the national security interests of the inspected State.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I also congratulate him on his excellent Spanish. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, before I address the topic of my intervention today, I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference. As members of the Group of 21, our two delegations cooperate very closely on a number of disarmament issues. I am sure you will continue to guide the work of the Conference with great skill. Thanks and appreciation of my delegation go to your predecessor as President, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for the authoritative and efficient manner in which he discharged his duties in this important office. I should also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Ambassadors Zahran of Egypt and Shah of India, as well as to Ambassador Neagu of Romania and Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia. My delegation and myself look forward to continuing with them the excellent cooperation we have had with their predecessors.

The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now seem to be entering into their final and decisive phase. They have continued to advance under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Batsanov, the chairmen of the working groups and the friends of the Chair. Provided that the necessary flexibility and determination is shown by all participants, there is every reason to expect that our efforts will be crowned with success in the course of the coming year. The convention would be a historical achievement and make the world a better place both for ourselves and for generations to come.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Article I constitutes the backbone of the draft convention. One of the major hurdles for the convention has recently been eliminated, through the inclusion of a provision on the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention. This was absolutely necessary and has considerably increased the prosects of progress on other remaining issues. A few remaining problems pertaining to articles I and II have not been actively discussed for several years. They must now be addressed and resolved. One of them is the question of prohibiting military preparations for use of chemical weapons. It was introduced in the negotiations long ago under circumstances that differ considerably from the present state of affairs. Today we have an unconditional prohibition of use in article I, and the need for a specific prohibition of military preparations does not, therefore, appear to be of the same importance as before. Thus, my delegation considers that paragraph 4 in article I is no longer needed.

The question of herbicides is another unresolved issue related to article I. It is the long-standing position of my delegation that the future convention should encompass a prohibition to use herbicides as a method of warfare. When the matter was discussed previously concerns were expressed that prohibiting the military use of herbicides could be interpreted as also prohibiting a State party from using herbicides, for example, to clear its own air bases, an activity which may be instrumental in supporting its war efforts. However, the formulation "as a method of warfare" makes it clear that such interpretations would not be possible. My delegation favours the inclusion in article I of a prohibition against the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, as contained in footnote 1 to the article. In view of tragic experiences in this field the chemical weapons convention could not simply ignore this problem. It is obvious that such an extension of the scope could not be coupled with verification mechanisms of the kind envisaged for chemical warfare agents. In the view of my delegation the only feasible verification would be the investigation of alleged use.

The difficult problem of "old chemical weapons", abandoned as stockpiles on the territories of other countries or found as remnants on the battlefield, will also have to be resolved. There are several problems connected with this issue, the most difficult being the question of responsibility for such weapons. There must also probably be some time limit for weapons to be included in this category. It seems to me that the problem of old chemical weapons will primarily have to be resolved bilaterally between the countries concerned, and that the multilateral convention should only refer to it in general terms.

A major breakthrough has been made over the past two years in finalizing the order of destruction in articles IV and V and their annexes. With the withdrawal of the "2% proposal" we now have an agreed text with agreed time-frames for the destruction of chemical weapons and an unambiguous obligation to destroy chemical weapons production facilities.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

This year new ideas have been introduced concerning the verification of the chemical industry. I note with great satisfaction the converging positions on the inclusion of "capab'e facilities" under article VI and appreciate that delegations do not reject the exploration of new ideas.

My delegation welcomes the fact that a substantial part of the chemical industry seems to be prepared to provide free access for international inspectors. Such an approach would considerably facilitate the definition of "capability". If a somewhat narrower concept is considered desirable however, my delegation believes that the exemption of certain kinds of production is the least complicated way to go.

A verification regime building upon an extended scope of declarations and nominations by States parties would constitute an important confidence-building measure, which would provide a possibility to demonstrate compliance with the convention. In the view of my delegation, declarations should be linked to production, present or planned.

The inspection site should in our view correspond to an entire plant site. From this follows that an inspection could include a variety of procedures depending on the nature of the site. The aim of an inspection should be to verify the declaration. A relatively simple inspection procedure should be the basis, with the possibility of increasing the intrusiveness, if the inspectors deem it necessary. The number of inspections possible within a given budget would then be significantly higher compared with the system currently outlined in the "rolling text".

The selection of facilities for inspection under article VI must be performed in such a way that the security concerns of States parties are taken into account. We do not, however, understand the reasoning behind a pre-determined concentration on inspections of schedule 2 facilities. In fact, my delegation does not believe that a risk assessment can be based on simple technical criteria. Thus, a selection by the technical secretariat based on such criteria would not be sufficient for singling out the most relevant facilities. A State party should take its own decision as to which facility it considers should be inspected. This must be the basis. It is conceivable, however, that inspections proposed by States parties could be complemented by inspections initiated by the technical secretariat according to agreed guidelines.

There has been much discussion about anonymous nominations. The preference for such nominations for inspections builds upon two different presumptions: first, that anonymity would avoid creating bilateral political problems and, second, that it would not be correct to single out one State party among several having made the same nomination. The list of nominated plant sites could be included in the annual report of the technical secretariat with an indication of the number of nominations for each of them.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

While very little work remains on article VII, much more should be done to start preparations for its implementation as the convention now approaches its completion. Regional efforts to publicize the forthcoming convention and its implications for the States parties on the national level play a very constructive role in this context. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my Government of the initiative that led to the regional workshop recently held in Mexico City under the auspices of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The "rolling text" with regard to article VIII has been cleaned up considerably. The core issues that remain to be solved are the composition, functions and decision-making of the executive council. How can we strike the right balance between representativity and efficiency of the executive council? It goes without saying that all States parties must be eligible for the executive council. This is not enough, however. The number of members of the council and the length of their term of office should also guarantee all States parties the possibility of serving on the council at reasonable intervals. This would undoubtedly be one important factor contributing to the universal adherence that we are all striving for. At the same time we must ensure that the efficiency of the council is not hampered. Therefore, my delegation suggests that 25-30 States parties be elected by the conference of the States parties for a two-year term. Furthermore, we suggest that provision be made for the possibility of enlarging the council at a later stage, if and when it is deemed appropriate.

The basis for the allocation of seats should be the need to ensure balanced geographical representation. However, other interests must also be reflected when composing the structure of the executive council. Political factors and the size of national chemical industries are also relevant. These interests should, at least to some extent, be taken into account within each regional group as it considers its internal allocation of seats.

It is necessary to apply a nuanced approach to the problem of inspections under article IX. This article should cover a whole spectrum, from consultations and requests for clarification on matters of compliance with the convention to requests for on-site inspections, which may be either undramatic or more or less confrontational. That is why my delegation has proposed using the term "inspections on request". It is evident from the discussion that a deliberate choice to make on-site inspections under article IX confrontational - as the term "challenge" implies - also inevitably puts more emphasis on the question of abuse.

It has been argued that if a violation cannot be proven the request should be considered an abuse of the convention. This is, of course, a grossly oversimplified view, but it may serve to deter any State party from requesting on-site inspections under this article unless it is practically 100 per cent sure that a suspected violation can be proven. Such an outcome

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

would jeopardize the whole effort to achieve an effective verification regime. Its purpose must be to deter violations of the convention rather than requests for inspections.

The terminology is of course less important than the substance of the matter under negotiation. The Swedish delegation will therefore not insist on the term "inspections on request", if this would hamper further progress on this article.

Sweden welcomes the fact that the presentation of CD/CW/WP.352 has now again brought article IX to the negotiating table. We particularly welcome the amendments proposed by the delegation of France. Together with previous documents, including CD/CW/WP.316, these contributions form a good basis for the work on article IX. The conclusion of that work is, in the view of my delegation, the most urgent task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The trend in the field of disarmament during the last few years has been to work towards greater transparency and openness as well as greater instrusiveness in terms of verification regimes and clarification of doubts about compliance. This is an important trend that inspires confidence and thereby promotes the security of States. It is on the basis of this trend, as well as of the need to create an effective "safety net" in the verification regime, that my delegation has approached article IX of the draft convention.

It is important to keep in mind that the work on a verification regime containing, among other important parts, inspections on request does not have a bearing on the chemical weapons convention only. It will also form the framework for the elaboration of verification regimes in other future multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation it is of the utmost importance that a request for an inspection be complied with by the technical secretariat automatically and without delay. Time is of the essence. A phased approach might be a way to take care, at least to a degree, of both the demand for automaticity and the concern regarding possible abuse. A time-consuming process, hampering the start of the inspection, could erode the credibility of the convention. Besides, it is likely that the executive council will closely follow the entire process of an inspection on request and thus play a significant role in deterring abuse of the convention.

Most countries have military installations which are of the highest importance to their national security. Sweden therefore favours a procedure which makes it possible for a State party to protect its national security without giving it the right of denying access to the facility in question. Managed access offers an acceptable way of dealing with these problems. In the view of my delegation, the more restricted access approach contained in CD/CW/WP.352 gives too much freedom to the inspected State party. It may be added that the need for a strict verification regime seems vindicated by recent events.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

It would be wrong to prescribe in advance what the executive council should do once the inspection report has been submitted. There is in fact a wide range of possibilities depending on the nature of the report: the report may provide compelling evidence of a violation, it may show that there was no evidence of a breach of the convention, or it may be inconclusive. The executive council should be free to draw its own conclusions and decide on measures it deems appropriate. It is not possible to cover in the text of the convention every conceivable case, nor is it desirable even to attempt such a futile exercise.

What is essential, nay necessary, is to have a convention that deters potential violators and inspires confidence in the effectiveness of its verification and complaints procedures. This also goes for the problem of possible abuses of its provisions. Article IX must not become a paper tiger. It must have real teeth.

It is of vital importance to ensure the multilateral character of the convention. It has been proposed that the requesting State party should have the right to send a representative to observe the conduct of the inspection. As I have stated before, my delegation has reservations against such an arrangement for two reasons. Firstly, it implies that the interntional team of inspectors cannot be trusted and therefore has to be checked by the requesting State party. This is not acceptable as a matter of principle and would create a very bad precedent for other international treaties. Secondly, it is questionable whether such a clause would be politically realistic. It is hardly conceivable that certain States would allow representatives of certain other States to be present at installations which they regard as sensitive. However, if some States parties would like to make bilateral or regional arrangements for the presence of observers at inspections on request they should be free to do so. But it should not be obligatory under the convention to allow the presence of observers from the requesting State. Such a clause might seriously undermine the convention's chances of obtaining universal adherence.

Sweden welcomes the agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee to include the draft texts of articles X and XI in appendix I. The agreed formulations in article X will make it easier for States parties to mobilize assistance in cases of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons by giving this provision the intended operational character. The settlement of this issue represents an important step forward in the negotiations.

For several years Sweden has argued for the inclusion of the text on article XI regarding economic and technological development in appendix I. No delegation had or has, in the view of my delegation, anything to gain by holding up this important issue.

Another result of the fruitful work that has recently taken place is the agreement on the article regarding the relationship between the future convention and other international agreements. Concerns that a future

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

convention might affect obligations under the Geneva Protocol are now dispersed. The Swedish delegation is satisfied with the present wording of this article, which follows closely the pattern set out in other disarmament treaties.

Tangible results have been obtained in the negotiations on the organization, measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions, amendments, settlement of disputes, and jurisdiction and control. The constructive attitude taken by delegations augurs well for the inter-sessional work in the area of legal and institutional matters.

Over the many years that the work on a chemical weapons convention has been going on progress has been slow, not because sufficient time has not been allocated but because of the lack of a genuine will in some quarters to engage in serious negotiations. It is above all a question of the will to engage in a process of give and take. This must be our focus. We now stand a better chance than ever to conclude these negotiations. Let us not miss this opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Králik, who will introduce the report distributed this morning as document CD/1104.

Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia): I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons on the work of this Committee during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before doing so, Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month and for the coming period while the Conference is in recess. Your ability, knowledge of disarmament affairs and personal enthusiasm ensure the efficacy of your guidance.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons is available to the delegations under the symbol CD/1104. The report reflects discussion on security assurances from different points of view and perceptions, which is very interesting and instructive. Many other points relating to the influence of the current international climate on security concepts and arrangements have been raised. Some of the issues were rather controversial but, I believe, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee now have a clearer picture of the items put before the Committee. Some orientations for constructive debate discovered during this session remain opened for the coming year. Within the Ad Hoc Committee we had a fruitful exchange of views on problems which will become more and more

(Mr. Králik, Czechoslovakia)

important in our time and also in the future. We have sought to avoid a traditional repetition of well-known positions, and I personally have looked for a working philosophy for comprehensive effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, we remain far from consensus on the substance of global security assurances or making any kind of breakthrough in this very sensitive field. But in the Committee we have listened to some interesting ideas, which could and should be elaborated on further.

In conclusion I would like to thank the group coordinators, Dr. Karem from Egypt, Mr. Duboisson from Belgium and Mr. Dimitrov from Bulgaria, as well as Mr. Guoling from the delegation of the People's Republic of China, for the cooperation and assistance they have provided to me during the session. I would like to thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Bogomolov, and his assistant Miss Borisoff. The same thanks I would like to extend to the interpreters and translators for their work. And I am also very thankful to my collaborator Dr. Gaspar for his assistance during the time I have accomplished my duties as Chairman.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1104, as well as the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would also like to congratulate him on the completion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, who will introduce his report on the open-ended consultations he chaired on the effective functioning of the Conference.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): On behalf of my delegation, Sir, may I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament at this important juncture and also welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India?

As the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament I have the honour to report on the results of these consultations. At the Conference's 586th plenary meeting it was decided that the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, which were initiated in 1990, would be continued during the 1991 session under the same chairmanship. The consultations were then conducted in a series of six meetings.

Discussions took place, once again, in a thorough debate on a wide range of subjects of common concern. Among these were the questions of the possibility of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, for which different formulas were advanced, of a re-examination of the existing groupings in the light of political changes which had taken place over the

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

past year, of a consideration of the possibility of amendments to the agenda of the Conference, of the interpretation and implementation of the rule of consensus, and of the review of administrative procedures agreed during the previous year's consultation.

The debate resulted in consensus on the following areas of possible improved and effective functioning. On intensification of work, there was general agreement that work on the chemical weapons convention had reached a stage where intensified work was necessary towards the objective of an early conclusion of negotiations. Agreed periods for intensified work, particularly during inter-sessional periods, were reported to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee concerned, and some of this intensification has already been implemented.

On non-member participation, a proposal for better participation by non-members in the work of the Conference on Disarmament was examined in detail, and it was agreed that the objective could be met by the following presidential statement to be read for the record at a plenary meeting of the Conference:

> "In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:
>
> "1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.
>
> "2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

It was felt that the exercise of informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament had once again proved its utility, not only in the general airing of views on matters of interest and concern, but also in the areas where positive decisions had been taken. The hope was widely expressed that the exercise would continue during the 1992 session, on the same format and under the same chairmanship as in the previous two years.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.410, and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The historic links between Venezuela and Mexico have been enriched over the last few decades by close cooperation in many fields. Personally speaking, I have had the pleasure of knowing you since we were together in New York in the 1970s. Consequently I am extremely pleased to take the floor under your presidency, a presidency which you are already exercising with your recognized diplomatic skill. I should also like to associate myself with your words of congratulations and welcome addressed to the new representatives of Egypt and India, Ambassadors Mohamed Mounir Zahran and Prakash Shah.

The Government of Mexico continues to attach great importance to work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, an item which has been on the agenda of this Conference since 1980 and which occupied a prominent place on the agenda of the ENDC as long ago as 1962. The history of multilateral disarmament negotiations shows how useful it would have been to have this programme from the 1960s onwards. The United Nations General Assembly, aware of that need, has been urging the member States of this Conference to redouble our efforts in this field. For two years now, within the context of the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade the General Assembly has reiterated this appeal. In the past decade modest progress has been made in the Ad Hoc Committee on this topic. Since last year, however, it has not been possible to re-establish the Committee. Hence the proposal made in February of this year to appoint a special coordinator for item 8 on our agenda. I should like in my capacity as Special Coordinator on item 8 (an appointment which I very much appreciate) to inform the Conference of the result of my consultations in the course of this year.

My report has the virtue of being extremely brief, as regrettably no significant changes have been recorded in the positions of the delegations present here. This is shown by the written communications conveyed to me by the spokesmen of the various groups on this item, as well as the delegation of China. The Group of 21, through its coordinator, the delegation of Cuba, reiterated the position set out in this plenary on 30 May last to the effect that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established as soon as possible. The delegation of China conveyed the same opinion to me. Meanwhile, the Western Group, through the delegation of Australia, conveyed to me what it had stated in this plenary, also on 30 May last, to the effect that it continues to consider that the circumstances are not yet propicious to continue the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and consequently they do not wish the Committee to be re-established. Lastly, the delegation of the Soviet Union, which coordinates the Eastern European Group, indicated to me that some delegations in that Group said that the Conference - and I quote in English to avoid any distortion -

(continued in English)

> "should do some additional work and conduct productive discussions about concrete future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament before its re-establishment".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, at this late hour of our debate I shall try to be brief, but allow me nevertheless to begin by joining the previous speakers in congratulating you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference and by wishing you every success in the discharge of your demanding tasks. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States. I am also pleased to welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India. At this particular juncture of our work, my delegation wishes to make some observations on agenda items 1 and 4, as well as briefly on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Let me first address agenda item 1 by welcoming the encouraging development in nuclear arms limitation and reduction. The long and delicate nuclear disarmament negotiations have been marked this year by the accomplishment of the INF Treaty, the first ever agreement eliminating a specific category of nuclear armaments, and more recently by the signing of START between the United States of America and the USSR, which will reduce some 30 per cent of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. It is the sincere hope of my delegation, not only that this agreement between the two States will soon be implemented, but also that further efforts for strategic arms reduction between them will be vigorously pursued.

While my delegation warmly welcomes these achievements, we nevertheless continue to believe that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is an essential step in halting the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons. It has been generally acknowledged that the development of new nuclear weapons will only complicate efforts to reverse the global arms race. The speedy achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is, therefore, a global concern. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been established this year with the mandate to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including its structure, scope and those of verification and compliance. It is encouraging to note that the Committee has, inter alia, addressed the questions of the possible establishment of a permanent global monitoring network, temporary localized monitoring and on-site inspections. The scientific Group on seismic events has also held a series of meetings including a very useful one with the Ad Hoc Committee. The draft protocol II of the PTBT on the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the draft of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as contained in document CD/1089, has also been discussed and in our view is still in need of further elaboration.

Although for those of us who have consistently advocated the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the work carried out in the Committee has somewhat fallen short of expectations, its intensive debate has indeed been an

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

encouraging sign hopefully leading towards more serious negotiations. Given the complexity of the question of a nuclear test ban and in view of the need for further substantive work, we believe it is imperative that the Conference allow the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the coming 1992 session. In the same vein we would like to recall once again that, as stipulated in the preambular paragraph of the 1963 PTBT, the original parties proclaimed that one of their principal aims was the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test any kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Therefore, we continue to believe that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the process of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty through the amendment of the 1963 PTBT should complement each other.

Turning to agenda item 4 on chemical weapons, my delegation would firstly like to make some observations on an issue that has attracted considerable attention, namely the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, under article VI of the draft convention. We firmly believe that the regime should be formulated to accommodate the legitimate interests of the chemical industries, especially those in the developing countries. It should be conceived in such a way as to safeguard the objective comparative advantages of particular industries against possible abuse motivated by commercial interests. In this regard it is important to ensure that the burden of compliance with the convention will not fall disproportionately on the emerging industries in developing countries. Hence there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between justified security considerations and legitimate economic interests. The formulation of provisions governing the implementation of this article should therefore be given priority by the Committee before finalizing the article itself. Given the fact that the implementation of the convention will affect thousands of facilities located in both developed and developing countries, the formulation of such provisions should also take into account the different levels of development of the States parties to the convention. We also share the view that the States parties should play a role in the selection process of facilities to be inspected. It is in this context that the Indonesian delegation stands ready to explore every possible avenue, together with other delegations participating in the negotiation, in order to establish a monitoring regime of the convention under article VI.

Article XI, which deals with economic and technological development, has also been intensively discussed during this year's sessions of the Committee. Like many other delegations, we consider this article to be a strong incentive for States to join the convention. We would go even further by suggesting that this article would give even greater motivation if it is to promote cooperation among States parties in activities which are not prohibited by the convention.

The agreement on the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and the basic undertaking on the total destruction of chemical weapons stocks as well as their production facilities, has indeed

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

removed the stumbling-block in the negotiation on article I. There are still, however, crucial issues which need to be resolved, such as the question on how to put into practical terms this basic undertaking on the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. We see that the political will which has emerged recently has provided us with an opportunity to begin the elaboration of practical measures regarding the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. In this connection, a new cooperative approach in order to find a practical solution to this question may be initiated among possessors of these weapons. Some States have given indications of their possession of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The information supplied by these States, and any future information given by other possessor States, would serve as the basic modality for the initiation of the new cooperative approach which I have just mentioned in this respect. Being a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservation which has never possessed nor produced chemical weapons we are very keen to see the total elimination of these weapons.

On the question of the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, my delegation wishes to recall the points it raised before the Committee during the discussions on this matter last year. We continue to believe that the representation of States parties to this body should reflect a balance in the political reality and geographical equitability of the States parties. In this regard, we preliminarily envisage the figure of 35 States as members of the executive council with the possibility of expanding the membership as the number of States parties increases. The example of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency might serve as a point of reference in the establishment of such a body.

The progress made in nuclear disarmament between the United States, and the Soviet Union and other progress registered in regional disarmament has created a new sense of optimism for new opportunities in multilateral disarmament. However, this optimism is somewhat tempered by the meagre results of various multilateral disarmament forums, including the Conference on Disarmament. It is in this context that the need to improve the effectiveness of the Conference is now more pressing than ever. We should spare no efforts in exploring more effective working methods in order for the Conference to fully discharge its mandate as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

My delegation is pleased to note our recent agreement that non-member States may participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to give advance notice. We share the view that the participation of non-member States should be encouraged and facilitated in order to enhance the prospect of universal adherence to agreements under negotiation in the Conference. On the other hand, we find it regretable that no progress has been made in the consultation concerning the "rules of consensus" and other important matters. Over the years the "rules of consensus" have often been applied as a veto and thus

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

hampered progress in the work of the Conference. Particularly disappointing is the difficulty to reach consensus on the establishment of ad hoc committees and their respective mandates. We would thus take this opportunity to reiterate our support for the proposal of the Group of 21, last July, to establish ad hoc committees on all items at the outset of the CD's annual session. By doing so, the beginning of substantive work would no longer be delayed by discussions on the establishment and the mandates of the ad hoc committees. There is still much work ahead of us in our common efforts to improve the effective functioning of this unique forum. It is for this reason that my delegation shares the widely expressed view that the informal open-ended consultations should be continued during the 1992 session under the wise guidance of the same Chairman.

We note that the preparation of this year's Conference report is under way. I would therefore conclude my brief statement by expressing the hope that the drafting and adoption of the final report, which should reflect the views expressed during this session, will proceed as smoothly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to offer my most heartfelt congratulations upon your accession to the presidency. My delegation welcomes the fact that a man of your experience and skill is presiding over our work at such an important time. Doubtless both your professional and your personal qualities will be of very valuable assistance to us. Hence my delegation wishes you every success and assures you of its full cooperation. I should also like to pay tribute once again to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar, for the skill and authority with which he discharged his duties. Lastly, I would like to note and welcome the arrival of the Ambassador of Egypt, Dr. Mounir Zahran, and the Ambassador of India, Mr. Prakash Shah, the representatives of two great countries with which my delegation is looking forward to continuing the relations of trust and friendship that it enjoyed with their predecessors.

I should like to address two subjects today. On the one hand, as I announced on the day following the signature of the START Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, my delegation wishes to outline France's position on this event which has rightly been described as historic. I should also like to announce the submission by my delegation, as an official document of the Conference, of the communique of the Paris meeting of the representatives of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on arms transfers and non-proliferation.

The French Government welcomed with keen satisfaction the signature of the START Treaty, which represents an important phase in the Soviet-American strategic dialogue aimed at arms control and disarmament. This is borne out

(Mr. Errera, France)

by the fact that for some systems the reduction is as great as 50 per cent, and that overall the implementation of the Treaty will result in a reduction of the order of 25 to 30 per cent of the total number of American and Soviet nuclear arms equipped with strategic delivery systems. My Government therefore considers that the START Treaty constitutes an excellent basis for other efforts to achieve additional limitations and reductions of the arsenals concerned. Aside from the fact that the implementation of the Treaty, once it is ratified, will take seven years, the work ahead remains considerable, in view of the enormity of the arsenals that had been built up over decades of East-West confrontation. That is why France commends the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake without delay a new series of discussions aimed at enhancing strategic stability even further, inter alia by dealing with the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. We note with interest that the space component of the Soviet-American strategic negotiations will continue to be on the negotiating table, and we therefore urge the conclusion of an agreement which would thus make it possible to avoid a destabilizing arms race. The French Government therefore supports the efforts of the United States and the USSR aimed at further cuts in their strategic arms.

The magnitude of their arsenals gives them good reason to continue their disarmament effort in respect of their own weapons. Even after the implementation of the START I agreement, there will still be a world of difference between the French nuclear deterrent and American and Soviet arsenals. From the outset France took a decision to acquire only the means necessary to pursue a policy of deterrence, that is, an arsenal sufficient to convince a potential aggressor - in any circumstances and whatever his means of defence - that he would run the risk of being confronted with a capability that could inflict on him, by way of reprisals for an attack, irreparable damage, that is to say damage out of proportion to the possible benefit he perceives. France will work to maintain its own capability within the strict limits of the principle it has always endorsed, the principle of minimum deterrence, naturally with the concomitant constraints on the continuation of its underground testing. France sincerely hopes that the United States and the USSR will be guided by this principle of minimum deterrence in their future strategic negotiations. The French Government wishes to recall that, for its part, it has never excluded the possibility of playing its role at the appropriate time in the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. Whatever its desire may be to see progress achieved in this nuclear disarmament, my Government wishes to recall that direct participation by France in negotiations would not be meaningful unless favourable conditions for such a dialogue were met, and the French Government will decide in due course whether future negotiations have brought such conditions closer.

Nuclear deterrence is the child of both the Second World War and East-West confrontation. The fact is that the fear and horror of nuclear war have made it possible to maintain peace for 40 years in Europe despite extreme tension and a one-sided build-up of gigantic conventional arsenals on our continent. Such a situation obviously cannot be changed overnight. Continuous

(Mr. Errera, France)

and parallel efforts are required in the political sphere and the military sphere. The year 1990, with the end of the division of Germany and of Europe, the agreement on conventional disarmament and the CSCE summit, marked a historic turning-point. Even though uncertainties may remain - as current events have reminded us - 1991 has recorded further decisive progress with the START I agreement. Agreement on a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons is in sight. But the task remains considerable, and we must spare other regions of the world the conflicts and dangers that Europe has experienced. That is why my Government is extremely alert to the problems of non-proliferation in the nuclear sphere, as in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons, and that of ballistic missiles.

With specific reference to the subject of regulating conventional arms transfers and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation, on instructions from my Government and in agreement with the other parties concerned, has just submitted as an official document of the Conference (under the symbol CD/1103) the communique of the meeting that the representatives of the five countries held in Paris on 8 and 9 July last. I think that we can all agree on the unprecedented nature of such a meeting and the importance of the discussions and the decisions that were reached. Without entering into the details of the communique, I should like to draw the Conference's attention to the following elements. The Five confirmed that they would not transfer conventional weapons when, in the light of the circumstances, such transfers would be likely to jeopardize stability. They agreed to support continued work to establish, under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, a register of arms transfers, drawn up on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters. They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, through the full implementation of Security Council resolution 687 and the adoption by all the countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control. Lastly, they expressed their intention to continue their discussions on these subjects, inter alia with a view to establishing guidelines to ensure the observance of rules of restraint as regards arms transfers.

My delegation considers it a matter of the utmost importance for the Conference on Disarmament to be kept informed of the work of the Five in these areas, work which complements the efforts of other States or groups of States. For its part it will do its best to contribute to those efforts.

I should now like to say the following in my personal capacity. I know that it is not customary in this forum to comment on an event or to express feelings, still less emotions. But there are times when morality and politics converge. There are times when, through its force, through its intensity, an event takes on universal significance. There are times when what is generally called progress takes on its full meaning. So when a country - and not just any country - succeeds in avoiding a hazardous enterprise, when a people expresses its will to resist and says no - no to threats, no to intimidation,

(Mr. Errera, France)

simply in order to live freely, and when men through their inspiration and their courage open the way to the noblest of all victories, the victory of freedom, we must be glad and we must say so. We must be glad for those who, because they wished it, succeeded in preserving their liberty; we must be glad at the triumph of the principles, values and ideals which we all espouse, that is to say the democratic principle, respect for the law; and lastly we must be glad too that the process of disarmament will continue, because - let us make no mistake - if disarmament agreements have been concluded in the recent past - the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in 1987, the agreement on conventional forces in Europe in 1989, the START agreement last month, which I have just referred to - if the conclusion of a global convention banning chemical weapons is within reach today, this is indeed because, in part at least, a process of reform and democratization was undertaken in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that the interruption of that process, a reversal of the trend in the Soviet Union, would have had particularly adverse effects for disarmament efforts and hence for our Conference. For that reason too we must be glad.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to call on Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, who has asked to speak.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to express my delight at your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this important period of our work. I am confident that your competence and wide diplomatic experience will be reflected in the achievements of this important negotiating for[illegible] in furtherance of the goals and objectives towards which we are all striving, namely the establishment of international peace and security through disarmament endeavours.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the kind welcome extended to me by yourself and also by the Ambassador of India and the other ambassadors. I wish to assure you and all the members of this Conference of my firm desire for continued cooperation, coordination and consultation at all stages of our work between my country's delegation and the delegations of all the States members of the Conference on Disarmament, which, in actual fact, constitutes a unique framework for the comprehensive discussion of disarmament matters since it is the only United Nations negotiating body concerned with those matters.

Egypt's interest in disarmament matters and in our Conference stems from basic principles that are deeply rooted in our Arab and African identity and inherent in our membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Egypt was one of the founder members and in the work of which it is still playing an active role, particularly in condemning the use of force in international relations and in advocating the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the arms race in outer space, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I take this opportunity to draw attention to President Hosni Mubarak's initiative in which he proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be removed from the Middle Eastern region, on the understanding that this would apply equally to all States of the region without distinction or discrimination. This initiative forms part of Egypt's endeavours to achieve the goals and objectives of full and general disarmament and to use the savings resulting therefrom to further the development endeavours of the developing countries. In this connection, we welcome the statement issued at the meeting of experts of the five permanent members of the Security Council, held at Paris on 8 and 9 July of this year, in which they referred to the importance of turning the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the Netherlands for the kind invitation that he extended to me, at the beginning of my assignment to this Conference, to visit The Hague on 23 and 24 August to inspect the facilities that his friendly Government is offering to accommodate the organization that we intend to establish within the context of the negotiations for the drafting of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The visit will undoubtedly be of benefit in our deliberations on this subject.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me to emphasize once again how proud I am to be working with you. I wish to assure you of my sincere desire to cooperate with you in this important international forum, as well as my sincere desire to cooperate with all the delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and its secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, has asked for the floor and now I invite him to make a statement.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): I am sorry to ask for the floor at such a late hour, but I would like to inform you that my statement will be very brief. First of all, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am confident that with your rich experience and outstanding diplomatic skills you will be able to accomplish in an exemplary manner the enormous and difficult task during the last stage of this session and provide a sound basis for next year's work. I would like to assure you that in discharging your responsibilities you will receive the full support and cooperation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for his outstanding contributions. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Romania, Egypt and India, who have recently taken up their posts. I wish them every success and I am looking forward to closely cooperating with them. At the same time I would also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassadors of India, Egypt and Brazil who have left us.

(Mr. Hou, China)

We have just listened very attentively to the important reports submitted by three committee chairmen - the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Králik, the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Kamal, and the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch. We warmly congratulate them and thank them for their outstanding efforts and contributions. The positive positions adopted by China on the issues in question have been reflected in relevant documents and during the process of consultations. We have taken note of document CD/1103, which has been circulated today, and we have also listened with attention to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Errera. In his statement he mentioned, inter alia, the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council on arms control in the Middle East, as well as the final communiqué.

I would like to point out that, in the view of China, the meeting was an important one, to which the international community attached great importance. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China participated in the meeting in a serious and responsible manner. During the meeting, the head of the Chinese delegation, the Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Mr. Liu Huaqiu, delivered important statements comprehensively expounding China's foreign policy of independence and peace and its principled stand and proposals on the issues of arms control in the Middle East, as well as his views and comments on the final communiqué of that meeting. On the instructions of the Chinese Government, I have already addressed a letter to the President of the CD requesting the circulation of the two statements made by Mr. Liu Huaqiu as an official document of the CD, and their translation into the other official languages of the CD so that the international community will understand comprehensively and fully the principled policy and positions of the Chinese Government. It is only natural that, for technical reasons, the translation of this document will take some time. I would like to express my appreciation to the CD secretariat for its assistance.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on Ambassador Prakash Shah of India, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. SHAH (India): I take the floor not because I have anything substantive to contribute at this stage to the deliberations of this Conference, but I would not wish to let this opportunity pass by without thanking you, Mr. President, and through you the colleagues in this Conference, for the very warm words of welcome that you have extended to me. I should also like to thank all those colleagues who spoke before me for their words of welcome and their offer of cooperation. As a newcomer to the CD, I shall need both their cooperation and their guidance in ample measure. Mr. President, I am specially happy that I am joining the deliberations today at a time when you have assumed the presidency. Knowing you as I do for many years, I have no doubt that at this critical juncture in the deliberations of the CD, your experience and abilities and your personal qualities will be

(Mr. Shah, India)

sorely needed for guiding the deliberations to a successful conclusion. All I would like to say here is that you have the full cooperation, not only of myself but also of my delegation, in making your task both smooth and successful.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to make a brief announcement regarding the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this afternoon. The open-ended consultations scheduled for 3 p.m. on inspections under article IX will not be held because of the need to conduct various other consultations. At 5.45 p.m. in conference room I there will be a meeting of the extended bureau to consider a number of unagreed issues related to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As I have the floor I would like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. First of all, I welcome you cordially to the responsible post you are now occupying and in that connection I should like to wish you every success. Your experience, diplomatic skills and outstanding personal qualities give us an assurance that success will accompany us at this decisive stage of the work of the Conference. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Solesby and Ledogar, for their effective guidance of the work of the Conference during earlier periods. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Prakash Shah of India and Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, and I should like to express my conviction that the relations of friendship and cooperation between their delegations and ours will be further productively developed.

In conclusion a few words about the fact that reference has been made at today's meeting to the dramatic events that have taken place recently in my country. I am deeply grateful to Ambassador Tóth and particularly to Ambassador Errera for the sentiments of satisfaction that they have expressed in connection with the failure of the anti-constitutional, anti-democratic coup. News of this collapse was received with profound relief and elation throughout the world, and first and foremost, of course, by the overwhelming majority of Soviet people. But even more important for us were the expressions of sympathy and solidarity which began to flood in literally from Monday morning, when it was still unclear what the outcome of the attempted coup would be. On behalf of the Soviet delegation I should like to express profound appreciation to all those colleagues who stood by us in those difficult days.

The victory of the young democracy in the Soviet Union naturally owes a great deal to the unprecedented international support and the firm rejection of the attempts to restore totalitarianism. But of course the main reason for

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

the victory lies within our country, in the far-reaching changes in our society that have occurred during perestroika, in the boldness and decisiveness, the readiness for self-sacrifice on the part of the man in the street and the resolve of the leaders of the democratic forces, among whom the President of Russia, Boris Eltsin, undoubtedly played a special role. Of course this victory has not eliminated all the problems, the often difficult problems, objective problems, that the Soviet people and Soviet society are now confronted with. These problems have yet to be dealt with, particularly in the economic sphere but also in a number of other spheres. But it has shown that there are forces within our society that are capable of resolving these problems by pursuing democracy, the pre-eminence of universal human values and the progressive integration of the Soviet Union in the world community of nations. Once again, many thanks.

And now, as a very last word, I revert to my duties as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Literally while I was speaking my attention was drawn to one more change in the schedule of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as follows: I must inform all delegates that the meeting of Group B scheduled for tomorrow has also been cancelled. So I would request you all to note that as appropriate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his important statement and for the announcements he has just made, which we have duly noted. As President of this Conference, under the current circumstances, and as the representative of Venezuela, I cannot fail to highlight the significance of the words just spoken by Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union. At this moment I cannot but express our infinite satisfaction at what doubtless is the final victory of democracy and fundamental freedoms in the Soviet Union. A victory which, as Ambassador Batsanov has just said, can be attributed to the Soviet people, its will to preserve and consolidate its important achievements of the last few years. I think I am reflecting the sentiments of all the representatives in this Conference when I emphasize the significance of what is happening in the Soviet Union and at the same time express my wishes for a steady improvement in the destiny of that great country which we so very much admire and appreciate. Thank you very much, Ambassador Batsanov, for your words. I now call on the representative of Cuba, who has asked for the floor:

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, this morning my Ambassador had an opportunity to congratulate you on the post you occupy in our Conference and to express our confidence that with your usual skill you will fully discharge the functions conferred upon you. I shall therefore confine myself to adding my voice to that of my Ambassador. As the delegate of Cuba I should like to thank all the distinguished ambassadors who have introduced reports this morning on the specific aspects of the work which have been entrusted to them in the course of the meetings of our Conference which are now coming to an end. I have also asked for the floor to express appreciation - on behalf of the Group of 21 on this occasion - for the information provided to this plenary on the outcome of his consultations on

(Mrs. Bauta Soles, Cuba)

the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 8 of our Conference, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, by the distinguuished Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch in his capacity as special coordinator for that topic. The report succinctly and clearly reiterates the wishes of the Group of 21, which, in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, seeks the re-establishment of the Committee and progress at its meetings. In our capacity as coordinators on the item for the Group we have also taken note of the wishes similar to ours expressed by the delegation of China, and those of some members of the Eastern European Group which also seem to tend in a similar direction. We hope that these majority interests will be duly weighed up for the purpose of eliminating the obstacles that precluded the re-establishment of the Committee on item 8 at this session, so that when our work begins again and the subsidiary bodies are re-established, the subsidiary body on agenda item 8 will not once again be an exception.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement, of which we have taken due note, as well as her kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? If not, I suggest we turn to other matters. In connection with the report introduced today by Ambassador Králik, contained in document CD/1104, I should like to inform you that I will be putting this before the Conference for adoption at the next plenary meeting on Thursday 29 August. I now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1099. If there are no objections I shall take it that the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to put before the Conference the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has been circulated in document CD/1097. The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group will meet in Geneva from 2 to 13 March 1992. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now invite the Conference to take not with appreciation of the report submitted today by Ambassador Kamal in his capacity as Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, circulated in document CD/WP.410.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to convey to Ambassador Kamal our sincere congratulations on the effective, competent and enthusiastic way in which he chaired the informal consultations. In connection with document CD/WP.410 I shall now proceed to make a statement on

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the participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference. I shall do so in English, as this was the language in which the text was negotiated in the informal consultations.

"In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:

"1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.

"2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

Before turning to the timetable of meetings for next week, I should like to report to you on our coming steps in respect of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. Today the secretariat has circulated the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3 and 7. Those related to agenda item 8 will be circulated shortly, possibly tomorrow, in delegations' pigeon-holes. In this connection it is necessary for us to begin our consideration as soon as possible once delegations have had enough time to consider them. I think that this requirement will be fully met if the group coordinators and coordinators on the items mentioned meet with me on the 27th at 3 p.m. in room I. Of course, any other delegations wishing to participate will be welcome. I hope we shall succeed in concluding our work on the substantive paragraphs on that occasion, as we will then have to take up the technical parts of the report and it is necessary to facilitate the task of the translation, typing and reproduction services which, as a result of some delays with the reports of the subsidiary bodies, are now receiving all the material for the annual report almost simultaneously. I repeat, then - and regrettably on this point the President has no flexibility, despite all his goodwill - 27 August at 3 p.m. in room I.

I suggest that we now turn to the timetable of meetings for next week. In keeping with the understanding reached in the consultations between the President and the coordinators, services normally as signed to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. On Thursday 29 August we shall proceed to consider, immediately following the plenary meeting, the technical parts of the annual report and the paragraphs relating to the work of the Conference on its improved and effective functioning. The relevant drafts will be

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circulated at the beginning of next week. The timetable circulated today by the secretariat takes account of these considerations. Of course, at this very late stage in the annual session some re-adjustments might be necessary, but it would be desirable to avoid delays or complications, as these might in one way or another jeopardize the conclusion of our work on 4 September. I suggest, then, that we adopt the timetable on that understanding.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no further business for today, and consequently I shall proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 29 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.604
29 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62482/3754B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 604th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

I am particularly pleased to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, a diplomat with an outstanding professional career who has just joined us. In so doing, Sir, I would like to stress the close and cordial links uniting our two countries, a model of good-neighbourliness, and the personal commitment as well as the commitment of my delegation to cooperate with you within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am certain that Ambassador Nunes Amorim will make a most useful contribution to the work we are doing here. So welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will put before the Conference for decision today, once we have concluded the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1104. As agreed in the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately following the plenary meeting to consider the technical parts of the report to the United Nations General Assembly, which have been circulated in documents CD/WP.409 and 411.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, who will do so to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Argentina, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Republic of Korea. I now call on the first speaker for today, the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to express to you my most sincere congratulations and satisfaction at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, a country with which Italy shares ancient and fraternal ties, presiding over our work. I am sure that under your capable guidance the Conference on Disarmament will be able to conclude successfully its activities for the 1991 session. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, for the skilful manner in which he presided over the Conference in the previous month; and in the meanwhile welcome all the new permanent representatives and colleagues who have joined us since the Italian delegation last took the floor in the CD plenary.

Before the annual session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close, I would like to summarize some of the views of my country regarding the negotiations which have been taking up so much of our time and efforts this year, and which we sincerely hope are now approaching the much longed-for conclusion. The events we have jointly witnessed would have provided us, in times less "interesting" than the current ones, with enough substance to fill up a timespan of various decades, rather than simply a few months. And, since in this final stretch of the millennium, days are unwinding as if each one of

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them contained events of a whole year, it is wise not to lose sight of day-by-day realities, paying the utmost attention to all those unrepeatable opportunities occurring almost daily.

The new impetus to the chemical weapons negotiations is the result of a tragic event, as a war always is, from which an innumerable set of lessons were drawn; and I would like to refrain from adding any further to it. We are now facing a new reality. It is encouraging to see that many former obstacles have been swept away. What is most important is the positive reality that has emerged from the tragedy of the war, resulting in a renewed role for the international community, not merely of a declaratory nature, to reaffirm legality against violence. We are faced now with an extraordinary opportunity to consolidate this yet fragile new dimension for the role of the international community. We should secure all its implications, as it not only represents the very foundation of the convention and of its future organization; but also because of the urgency, on a more general outlook, to provide credible and acceptable frameworks to ensure stability, while former strategic balances are breaking down.

Our debate on article IX is important in itself as well as for some of its implications of a more general nature. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to whom I would like to convey the sympathy and appreciation of the Italian delegation, has therefore been right in devoting prior attention to the issue, against the backdrop of the ongoing events of the Gulf War aftermath. The problems yet to be solved on challenge inspection are basically turning around the critical question of striking the right balance between the protection of the legitimate interests of a State (security and confidentiality) and the need to consolidate the ever-increasing role of the international community through its organs, represented, in the specific case of article IX, by the executive council, the technical secretariat and by the inspection team.

In our view, it is possible to reach a compromise between these requirements, without undermining the prominence of the role of the future organization in fulfilling the main duties it has been entrusted by the convention. The availability of a neutral instrument above parties is useful to ensure and verify compliance but it also represents a guarantee against possible distortions of controls to the detriment of State parties' interests. It would not otherwise make sense to set up a new, costly and complex international organization if controls of the kind foreseen by article IX could be implemented through inter-State mechanisms, such as those existing in the INF, Stockholm and CFE agreements.

Allow me to cite some concrete examples, with regard to the role of the above-mentioned three organs, beginning with the director-general of the technical secretariat. He seems already implicitly empowered to check whether the elements of the request are assembled according to the basic procedural requirements listed in part III of the protocol on inspection procedures as annexed to document CD/CW/WP.352, as well as in the relevant section of the "rolling text". Upon notification, the requirement is in fact spelled out that the request should contain, inter alia, "the concern regarding compliance

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with the convention, including a specification of the relevant provision of the convention about which concerns have arisen, and the nature and circumstances of the suspected non-compliance", failing which one could envisage the return of the incomplete request to the challenging State, with an invitation to insert any missing elements. It would not be a substantive "filter", irreconcilable with the need for tight time-frames, but, rather, a procedural one, which the director-general of the technical secretariat would be called upon to fulfil through a formal evaluation of the admissibility of the request.

Furthemore, another element would seem relevant to the purpose of preventing negative consequences for the inspected State arising from requests not consistent with the scope of the convention: I am referring to the role of the inspection team and to the possibility that, during the conduct of the inspection, or even when drafting the inspection plan, a certain leeway and flexibility may be recognized in implementing the degree or the extension of the intrusiveness of the inspection, whenever it came across manifestly unfounded requests. In such circumstances it could even, in extreme situations, assume the responsibility of suspending or interrupting the inspection, thereby declaring it null and void. We therefore share the views of those who consider that the mandate should be flexible enough for the inspection team to tailor the inspection to the conditions they meet on the site.

The material conduct of the inspection can also provide us with some of the answers for the central dilemma of this system of verification, consisting in the search for the all too famous best balance between protection of confidentiality and the required intrusiveness of the controls. We are of the opinion that it may be possible to include more stringent provisions in the useful approach reflected by the four Western delegations, as far as inspections of undeclared sites are concerned, irrespective of the need to ensure in any case greater intrusiveness for the verification system of declared facilities.

We acknowledge the legitimate concerns of countries that, more than others, may find themselves potentially exposed and at a greater risk of disclosing national-security-related information not relevant to the convention. Concerns of such a nature, according to recent experience with national trial inspections (and as indicated also in the above-mentioned document), may be taken into account, in certain specific and sensitive circumstances, by giving exceptionally only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, binding these inspectors with specific commitments about non-disclosure of unrelated confidential information. Furthermore, with regard to the need to secure the site in advance, in order to protect it from tampering of any kind, further thought should be given to the various possibilities of giving the inspection team discretion in checking incoming and outgoing traffic, by means of randomized controls, especially when inspecting large sites, or adopting some criteria in terms of quantitative thresholds (such as the tonnage of vehicles). We are of the view, in other words, that there is still further negotiating "room for manoeuvre" in order to reconcile positions and requirements which we believe will be less constraining in reality than in theory.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Many delegations are also questioning the compatibility of the role of the observer, or his mere presence, with the neutral and super parties nature of the inspection team. We believe, like others, that the role of the observers should be a subsidiary one as opposed to the primary role of the team. But, at the same time, we are of the view that the observer could represent a useful instrument for the good conduct of the inspection, as he will be the conveyor of any information at the disposal of the requesting State that might be usefully disclosed to integrate the initial input by the latter. It would otherwise be difficult for a State party to entrust the organization with the task of verifying the well-foundedness of its own concern without feeling obliged at the same time and in its own interest to allow the organization to avail itself of all relevant information at the disposal of the State party itself.

I would at this stage also like to express a few considerations on the role of the executive council in the final stage of the challenge inspection. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, it should not be necessary to provide for an automatic convening at the end of the inspection, if only for practical and financial reasons, on the condition, however, that a single State be allowed to request such a meeting. Where the executive council is convened, two main procedural scenarios are set: in the first, an initial debate would take place on the substance of the final report, with no consequences in terms of possible recourse to measures to redress the situation. It would at that stage be simply a question of "reviewing" the situation and each member of the council, as well as each of the two concerned States, will be entitled to express its views on the conclusions of the report. It would not be necessary, at this juncture, to have any specific voting requirements by the executive council, as it would add nothing to a debate which would per se clearly indicate what the prevailing views are.

If, however, the executive council were to deem it necessary to have a follow-up to the review of the situation, in terms of promoting "any appropriate further action" - to quote the exact wording in the "rolling text" as well as in other relevant documents - in that case a decision by the executive council might prove necessary through recourse to the voting procedures agreed in the convention. We reserve the possibility of introducing a more precise textual proposal on this specific point.

In concluding on article IX, on which I have perhaps dwelt too extensively because of its symbolic character, I would state our readiness to agree on an inspection instrument that should be both effective and devoid of the possible arbitrary uses that some States, in good or bad faith, might make of it. An inspection system, in other words, entrusted to the superior responsibility of a multilateral and international organization going beyond the States themselves.

Consistently with such a general political approach, Italy is accurately assessing the possibility of carrying out a series of trial inspections, of multilateral and bilateral character, with countries belonging to the Mediterranean and middle eastern areas, which are particularly close to us and with which we share close ties of cooperation.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Please allow me to briefly touch upon another specific but still important point. In our view, the possibility of the continued existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 beyond the entry into force of the convention could well be discussed, especially as a means to safeguard the international community from future withdrawal of States from the convention. However, the question of whether reservations to the Geneva Protocol should be allowed to continue to exist is a different issue and should be considered separately. Such reservations, on the entry into force of the convention, would no longer be compatible with the new version of article I, which provides for an unconditional prohibition of use. It would seem contradictory to allow a State to commit itself to such a new and far-reaching prohibition, while maintaining at the same time reservations safeguarding its right to retaliate "in kind".

Gaps to be filled up are always to be found, when a historical phase is over and a new one appears, charged with great promise but also with unknown factors, casting implications not always easily foreseeable. The stability of the world belonging to the recent past was, to say the least, the result of a negative factor: the fear of a nuclear holocaust in case of a military conflict of vast proportions with neither winners nor losers.

With the end of East-West confrontations, reliance on nuclear weapons is bound to face drastic reductions. This is Italy's persuasion and I am glad to associate myself with the worldwide appreciation for the signature of the START Treaty in Moscow, that we consider a first important step towards greater and more ambitious goals. Other positive forces are taking shape today, first and foremost those represented by public opinion and the consent of the people. We have seen in recent days the extent of their effectiveness. There is a need for such emerging consensus to rest on updated international structures, on a global or regional basis.

The convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons contains a number of important innovations, to be connected with a growing role of the organs of the international community, above States parties. Other opportunities are ahead of us in the field of multilateral disarmament, and I would like to confirm that my country has trust in the future role of this negotiating body, worthy of being strengthened and updated at the appropriate time, in terms both of its composition and future competences. In the meanwhile it would be useful to devote the efforts we usually make to putting forward our own views also to the understanding of everyone else's positions. This could help us in avoiding unnecessary and time-consuming procedural wrestling. We are willing to cooperate in this direction, and we are confident in the success of our future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important stage and to wish you every success in your responsible task. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is about to complete its work in a very different climate from those that preceded it in recent years. Internationally, where tensions are diminishing and confrontation is giving way to reconciliation and cooperation, the peoples of the world no longer wish to return to the cold war, but ardently desire real disarmament being brought about as quickly as possible in order to maintain security and lasting peace. Most particularly, having witnessed the development of the situation that arose before and during the Gulf war, which took place under the threat of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, they aspire to seeing the day come soon when our planet will be free for ever from power politics and sophisticated war matériel, which have caused immeasurable misfortune and suffering to a great many innocent inhabitants of that region.

In order to establish lasting peace and security around the world and to bring about development, there must be an end to the source of the factor of disturbance. At the present stage disarmament or arms control is not for most developing countries an immediate priority because they do not have an immense quantity of weapons to reduce, nor are they able to take part in the arms race, as the great Powers are. However, international relations today oblige them to attach great importance to disarmament. This is because comprehensive and global disarmament is vital for them, given the history of colonization by armed forces, the two major world wars that covered the globe, several hundreds of clashes and violent postwar conflicts - here I would like to stress that almost 170 armed conflicts, large and small, which have followed more than four decades of the postwar period, have broken out, all of them in the developing countries - and the current state of affairs under the permanent threat of nuclear weapons. The latter do not need the circumstances in which they will be obliged to spend considerable sums on importing weapons from the developed countries, but a climate of peace in which they can devote those sums to economic recovery. In other words, they need relations of international cooperation for their prosperity, but not a military threat from which they must suffer directly or indirectly. In short, this is tantamount to saying that it is incumbent upon the developed countries in general and the nuclear-weapon States in particular, beginning with the super-Powers, to be in a position, indeed to have the duty, to establish in the sphere of disarmament such an international climate of peace for humanity. With this in view, we welcome the agreement on the complete destruction of chemical weapons arrived at by the Americano-Soviet super-Powers, and the signing of the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the START Treaty, and we also appreciate the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As everyone is aware, such occurrences did not come about because of the talent of a few individuals, but were the result of a policy following the political will of the authorities. Consequently, we are persuaded that it is only when not only their political promise, whether in the case of a treaty, a convention or an agreement, has been implemented as quickly as possible, but also when it has been extended to a great many other sectors and regions, that the multilateral negotiations on disarmament will easily attain their final objective.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

What is currently threatening the existence of humanity itself is, first and foremost, an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons deployed in different parts of the globe. The reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, a ban on nuclear testing to prevent qualitative enhancement, and their complete abolition, constitutes the unanimous demand of the peoples of the world. Although a number of positive initiatives and measures have been adopted to reduce nuclear weapons, problems here and there still arise which prompt a great deal of concern on the part of humanity. Since this is just a beginning, as long as new nuclear tests continue in order to improve the quality of these weapons, which offsets and goes far beyond the cuts, and as long as the changes to promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons on foreign soil have no practical effect. We hope that on the basis of their international obligations to dispel the disquiet of the peoples of the world, the nuclear super-Powers will adopt measures to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region most threatened by nuclear war, first and foremost, so that their promise can be fulfilled constantly.

It is very well known that it is the Korean peninsula which is the most dangerous region where a nuclear war could break out in the aftermath of the Gulf war. The survival of the Korean people has been threatened for more than 30 years by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. These nuclear weapons not only seriously threaten peace and security in Korea, but also exacerbate the regional situation to the utmost. No country in Asia will believe that the nuclear weapons in South Korea would remain targeted on the North or that they would not one day be pointed towards themselves. These nuclear weapons were deployed, we are told, by one of the main nuclear-weapon countries during the cold war period when they considered the Korean peninsula as their theatre of operations for a nuclear showdown, as a means of dissuasion. That having been said, nothing can justify the presence of a great number of nuclear weapons in South Korea, in the context of a shift from confrontation to cooperation and the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Against this background, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 July last, submitted a new proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The text of the proposal was distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1096), the main thrust of which is as follows. The north and south of Korea shall agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint statement thereof. They should negotiate the matters concerned and adopt a joint declaration with legal effect not later than the end of 1992 providing in particular for a ban on the testing, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons by north and south, the prohibition of the deployment and passage of such weapons and related military exercises in the sphere of the nuclear-free zone, and verification of the absence of nuclear weapons through inspections of the north and south.

The United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear-weapon States neighbouring on the Korean peninsula, shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and this region is proclaimed a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Within one year after

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

the north and south of Korea jointly declare the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, the nuclear-weapon States should remove all factors contravening the nuclear-free status and give assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. In particular, measures should be taken to withdraw American nuclear weapons from South Korea. Asian non-nuclear-weapon States shall support the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and respect its status.

Our new proposal took into consideration the position recently adopted by the United States whereby they would not object in principle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, provided that the parties involved agreed on this point, and the support they have shown for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, in South Asia and in Africa. The United States Department of State issued a declaration that was not negative, I would even say positive, towards our proposal, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Korea, through a spokesman, alluded to his consent, albeit conditional, to discussion of our proposal.

My Government is ready to undertake negotiations with the south Korean side at any time and at any level, and the same applies to the United States. It is convinced that once negotiations have begun, a happy future will open up as regards the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone. It would harm no one but would benefit everyone. Given that our proposal provides for realistic and practical measures, the denuclearization of the peninsula, if the authorities of South Korea and the United States truly desire it, will be attained in very short order. If the Korean peninsula is made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the source of any nuclear war will be eliminated, and this will create conditions conducive to consolidating peace and security in Korea and in Asia and the peaceful reunification of Korea.

For more than 10 years the Conference on Disarmament has engaged in an effort to eliminate chemical weapons, one of the weapons of mass destruction, from the Earth once and for all. It has taken various steps, particularly this year, to draw the attention of many countries to the importance of the issue of chemical weapons, while intensifying negotiations for the preparation of the convention. As a result of these endeavours, we have seen some successes: the number of participants in the session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has risen among non-member States; a breach has opened in the negotiations and agreement has been reached on many provisions. This gives hope for the adoption of the convention by the end of 1992 at the latest. We feel that problems such as the verification system, the executive council and others can be resolved if the negotiations are directed towards taking sufficient account of the concern of non-chemical-weapon countries, particularly developing countries. Clear experience has also been acquired this year to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. This is, we may say, a forum for the adoption of general disarmament measures to ensure peace and security throughout the world. For that reason participation in the Conference on Disarmament should be enhanced on a large scale, so that the problems of the widest possible variety of regions and categories are fully reflected and dealt with. We consider that the number of member States should be increased and in the immediate future the participation of non-member

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

States in the Conference made much easier. In this regard my delegation would like to propose that we consider changing the procedure so that, if non-member States submit an application to participate in sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, their participation can be renewed by tacit agreement every year unless any objection is raised.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Shah, who will introduce the report distributed this morning with symbol CD/1106.

Mr. SHAH (India): Before I present the report, Mr. President, let me join you and other previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil amongst us. I wish him success in his endeavours here and extend the full cooperation of my delegation to him.

I have taken the floor to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban which is on the table today as document CD/1106. Having presided over the Ad Hoc Committee only during its last stage of the final consideration and adoption of its report to the Conference, my task has been easy. The harder work had already been accomplished over the year by my predecessor, Ambassador Chadha. Even before the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, there were many questions as to what the Ad Hoc Committee would be doing and how it would go about its work. The fact that its work has gone smoothly and it was conducted in a cordial and constructive atmosphere owes much to the excellent cooperation all delegations extended to my delegation throughout the year.

Before his departure, at a plenary meeting on 25 July, Ambassador Chadha gave his impressions of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I should like to refer delegations to that statement again. A spirit of compromise was manifest during the organization of the work and the quality of the debates on the three clusters of questions which the Ad Hoc Committee had assigned itself, namely general debate, structure and scope and verification and compliance was indeed high.

I should like to emphasize that the report in front of you today represents a serious and considered, and at times highly technical, exchange of views held this year. The goal was to lay the groundwork for eventual negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The goal, I believe, has been largely achieved. The report deals with substantive issues. It touches on the main questions relating to the achievement of a nuclear test ban. As we are all aware, nuclear testing is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue connected directly to the defence and security concerns of States. In a rapidly changing world, a phrase which tended in the past to be a cliche, but now has taken on new significance, it is even more imperative that the security concerns of all sides must be respected. I believe the report presents in a balanced manner the genuine differences of perception of security needs that continue to exist with relation to a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Shah, India)

Bearing those differences in mind, the Ad Hoc Committee accomplished an important task: the international community represented here in this negotiating forum has kept the question on its agenda, in the context of a subsidiary organ, exploring the areas of agreement and disagreement and preparing for future work. An important contribution to future work on the item was made in the agreement reached by the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend that it be re-established at the beginning of its 1992 session. I definitely endorse this recommendation.

Allow me to express my appreciation to the delegations participating in the work of the Committee this year. Allow me also on behalf of Ambassador Chadha and my delegation to express a special note of thanks to all ambassadors who took a special interest in the deliberations and in particular the group coordinators: Mr. José Felicio of Brazil, Mr. Max Gevers of the Netherlands and Mr. Vladimir Gaspar of Czechoslovakia. I also thank Mr. Zhang of China for his contribution. It would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent support my delegation received from Mr. Cassandra and Mrs. Cummins from the secretariat. Both of them worked extremely hard for the sake of the successful conduct of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. Finally, may I, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, thank all the interpreters responsible among others for the efficient translation of complicated terminology which contributed to the smooth conduct of our meetings this year?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1106. I should also like to sincerely congratulate the delegation of India, responsible for the chairmanship, on the conclusion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now call on the distinguished representative of Argentina, Mr. Grossi, who, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, will introduce the report of that Committee, which is contained in document CD/1105.

Mr. GROSSI (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me at the outset to extend the most cordial welcome on behalf of my Ambassador and my delegation to the ambassadors of India, Prakash Shah, Egypt, Mounir Zahran, and Brazil, Celso Amorim, who are joining this Conference at an especially important time in its negotiations. We are certain that their presence will give impetus and creativity to this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. As of now we pledge our firmest support and cooperation in our joint efforts.

On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán, I have the signal honour this morning to put before the Conference for its consideration the report of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the consideration of item 5 on the agenda of our organ, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, contained in document CD/1105. In so doing my delegation would briefly like to stress some aspects related to the report we are introducing today. These pertain to the task we have been accomplishing during this session in the exercise of the chairmanship of this subsidiary body. Firstly, we believe that the report we are introducing this morning

(Mr. Grossi, Argentina)

contains certain elements enabling us to assert that the Committee has worked hard in an attempt to find areas of consensus in a field which is not always easy. A reading of the report will indicate that the members of the Committee considered it appropriate this year to adopt a more dynamic and practical methodology which would enable them to tackle the items before the Committee in a more detailed manner. The Chair thus drew up a series of lists of topics, for the purpose of bringing some order into the debate and also to single out those issues which incontestably enjoy the attention of delegations, leaving aside those which do not seem to awaken such interest. The lists have been annexed to the report and might perhaps serve to guide future debates within this Committee.

For the first time since its establishment in 1985, the Committee made use of the device of friends of the Chair, in order to tackle three specific subjects. Respectively, these were important terminological issues for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, aspects connected with verification of anti-satellite weapons, and confidence-building measures, including improvements in the existing and future databases in the space field. On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, I should like most especially to express my gratitude for the valuable cooperation extended in their capacity as friends of the Chair by Mr. Anthony Monckton of the delegation of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mahmoud Karem of the delegation of Egypt and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin the delegation of the Soviet Union, who coordinated the consultations related to the three items indicated in the order I mentioned. The results of their efforts can be consulted by delegations in the shape of the working documents which will contain their respective reports. The work of the group coordinators, Mr. Christer Elm of the delegation of Sweden for the Group of 21, Mr. Marc Finaud of the delegation of France for the Western Group and Mr. Plamen Grozdanov of Bulgaria and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin of the Soviet Union for the Group of East European and other States, as well as the distinguished delegate of China to the Committee, Mr. Zhan Yang, also deserve all our thanks. We also most warmly thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a subject of crucial importance for the security of all States, whether space Powers or not. The Ad Hoc Committee which this Conference on Disarmament established six years ago for the first time reflects that interest and attempts to make progress in conformity with its programme of work towards the definition of areas of convergence. We hope that the work that we have done this year has contributed to that lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement. I would be grateful if you would convey to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee our most sincere congratulations on the conclusion of the tasks assigned to that subsidiary body. I now call on the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Moon.

Mr. MOON (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as it is for the first time that my delegation takes the floor under your presidency, I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption

(Mr. Moon, Republic of Korea)

of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that, under your able and experienced guidance, the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament will achieve a substantial and successful conclusion.

My delegation wishes to just briefly touch upon the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula. It is well known that the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA as a commitment to the implementation of non-proliferation has promoted confidence-building among the States parties and facilitated adherence to the NPT by other non-parties, thus strengthening the effectiveness and universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

As was already mentioned in my delegation's earlier statement of 27 June, the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. This concern has been expressed without ambiguity by a number of countries in the meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors and other international forums such as the NPT Review Conference. My delegation wishes to stress that the concern expressed in one way or another is not the view of a single country but the collective concern of the world community.

As a result of the concerted efforts of the international community, we are now witnessing a step forward with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. At the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed with the draft safeguards agreement proposed by the IAEA, with a view to submitting the draft agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session.

While welcoming such a development, my delegation cannot but express our particular concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still attaches extraneous elements to the conclusion of the safeguards agreement as well as to the implementation. We all know that to bring extraneous elements to the NPT system is contradictory to the obligations incurred by member countries under the NPT.

The earliest and speediest conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA is the only way to put an end to the lingering suspicions and misgivings of the world community. My delegation believes that a move in this direction will contribute not only to strengthening of the universal application of the NPT regime, but also to removing obstacles standing in the way of inter-Korean confidence-building and the reconciliation process.

Now my delegation cannot but refer to the North Korean proposal, that is, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Since the proposal on the establishment of such a zone was launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the late 1970s, the proposal has not received much support from the international community. The proposal, being ideal in its concept, but unrealistic in its implication, has been advanced

(Mr. Moon, Republic of Korea)

without taking into account the regional politico-military situation as well as the views of other States in the region, which is a fundamental prerequisite for the proposal coming under this category.

In this regard, we wish to recall again that the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference stated, inter alia, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and should also take into account the characteristics of the region. The proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea therefore falls far short of the internationally recognized standards on the establishment of such a zone.

With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal concerning the establishment of such a zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July, my delegation wishes to reiterate my Government's position by quoting the statement by the Republic of Korea's Foreign Ministry's spokesman on 1 August.

> "Firstly, the Korean Government takes note that North Korea's proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July 1991 contains some new details compared with its previous proposals.
>
> "Secondly, the Korean Government wishes to make it clear that as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, North Korea should accept full-scope IAEA inspection on all nuclear-related material and facilities on its soil, including the reprocessing facilities. The fulfilment of this obligation cannot be linked with any other issues.
>
> "Thirdly, after having made this clear, the Korean Government considers that, for the purpose of reducing tension and building confidence on the Korean peninsula, military and other matters including nuclear non-proliferation can be discussed between the South-North Korean authorities in the future."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. There are no more speakers on the list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? I call on the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Nunes Amorim.

Mr. AMORIM (Brazil): Mr. President, I will be very brief, but I want to thank you very much for the kind words you addressed to me. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be welcomed at the Conference on Disarmament by a representative of a Latin-American country, a neighbouring country of Brazil with which we enjoy special relations. You have been appointed President of this Conference at a very important moment of finalizing the report to the

(Mr. Amorim, Brazil)

General Assembly, and I trust that your able guidance will, as it has already, bring us to our desired results of informing the United Nations of the fruitful work of the Conference in the 1991 session.

Let me also thank all the colleagues present in this session for the warm welcome I received, and most specially Ambassador Shah of India and my colleague from Argentina. In response to your friendship I offer the full cooperation and the constructive participation of my delegation in the activities of the Conference. It is a great honour for me to attend the sessions of the Conference in this Council chamber at such an important moment for the fulfilment of its tasks. It will be a heavy responsibility for me to discharge the functions which in the past were carried out by many prominent representatives of Brazilian diplomacy. It is my strong wish to continue their work in such a way that my country can further contribute to the cause of international security and disarmament. To accomplish my tasks, I rely on the most valuable help offered to me by the distinguished delegates to the Conference, and by yourself, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now very briefly call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I will be very brief. With regard to the question of Korea there are a lot of things to say, politically, militarily, historically, but this should be discussed between the countrymen from North and South - we could solve these problems. This is not the forum to mention and discuss those things. Therefore I refrain from saying all the details. But I would like to emphasize one thing clearly, that the real threat of nuclear war is not from the North, but from the long-standing side, from the South. This is well known. I would like to emphasize once again that my Government has not the willingness to produce nuclear weapons and we have no big capabilities to do so and we do not have the necessity to produce and to have those awful weapons on Korean territory. I made it clear. We have the constant policy to conclude and to implement our international obligations under the NPT, so we have negotiations though we have some difficulties in the real situations. We have negotiations; progress we have made, and we will fulfil. When some persons are talking loudly about these questions as a new danger in Korea, this is something else to cover the real threat. Therefore we ask them to stop such manipulations in the future.

With regard to our proposals for a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, this is derived from the anxiousness and strong aspirations of the Korean people to escape from the nuclear threat and nuclear disaster which presently prevails on the Korean peninsula. This is not a trick, this is not a kind of game, nobody can play with such serious problems. This proposal has been broadly supported by various circles of the international community, not only the Governments but also many social circles - I would like to make it clear - as well as this endeavour of our Government should be fulfilled with the support of the international community. When we proposed these new proposals the Governments of the Soviet Union and China immediately supported

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

them and a positive reaction was shown for the first time by the Government of the United States. Therefore, this fact shows that the Korean peninsula is a place where the world community is drawing deep attention and should be solved as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I suggest we move to other matters. As I mentioned before, I will now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1104. If there are no objections I shall take it the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In connection with the two reports introduced today, I propose to put them before the Conference for adoption during the plenary meeting of 4 September next.

Before proceeding to examine the calendar of meetings for next week, I would like to report to you on the status of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. The open-ended informal consultations on agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8 have been concluded successfully. The secretariat is preparing the revision of the working papers in all official languages. It is hoped that the texts in English will be ready tomorrow, Friday afternoon and at the latest on Monday afternoon in the other official languages.

The subsidiary bodies have concluded their work and their reports are being prepared in all the official languages. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be ready later than the others, as this Committee concluded its work at the eleventh hour on Tuesday. The English text will be available on Tuesday the 3rd in the morning and the remaining languages first thing on Wednesday the 4th. Owing to the size of the report and the fact that the Committee was not able to conclude its work last Monday as planned, it has not been possible to have it available earlier.

As I announced today, we shall be considering in an informal meeting this morning immediately following the plenary the technical parts of the report appearing in documents CD/WP.409 and 411. I hope that these will not prompt any difficulties. In any event, it is obvious that as the necessary documents are circulated delegations will need time to consider them. Hence it seems desirable that the second and last reading of the draft annual report should take place in an informal meeting on Wednesday, 4 September, before the adoption of the report in plenary. This has also been our approach in years past when this was necessary. So for the meetings on the 4th, we shall have the following documentation: documents CD/WP.409 and 411, relating to the technical parts of the report, along with an addendum if any amendments prove necessary, and revision 1 of the four documents already circulated on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8. The new documents will be distributed in delegations' pigeon-holes as they come out.

(The President)

The timetable for next week circulated today by the secretariat takes into account the observations I made on the annual report. Also, in accordance with the understanding arrived at in the President's consultations with the coordinators, to which I referred at the last plenary meeting, the services assigned to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been put at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I suggest then that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should now like to inform you of a change regarding the meeting scheduled for 3 p.m. this afternoon in room V. According to the timetable for this week, that meeting was to be a meeting of Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It has now been decided that, instead of that group, it will be Group C that will hold a meeting on that occasion.

I have no further business, and shall therefore proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 4 September, immediately following the informal meeting devoted to the consideration of the draft annual report.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.605
4 September 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Wednesday, 4 September 1991, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62517/3781B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 605th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The entire international disarmament community has learned with great sorrow of the loss of one of the most important persons in the field of multilateral negotiations. Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles leaves an indelible memory which goes beyond the borders of his own country and region to attain worldwide scope. In addition to having served as Secretary of External Relations for Mexico, he held many senior posts in his country's Foreign Ministry, and in particular was head of the delegation to this negotiating body between 1967 and 1989. For many years he was the dean of the Ambassadors accredited to this Conference, and participated in the negotiations on the four international instruments concluded in this room, contributing through his vast knowledge as well as his extraordinary skill and diplomatic experience to the success of those negotiations. The text of each of those instruments contains provisions that reflected his concerns and aspirations. While his input at the multilateral level was decisive, his contribution at the regional level with the elaboration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, on the first nuclear-weapon-free zone declared in an inhabited region, can be regarded as a model of intelligence, tact and tenacity in the service of a Latin American ideal that he never lost sight of, despite his undeniable importance and personal significance in worldwide multilateral negotiations.

Alfonso Garcia Robles, the worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, marks a whole era in multilateral diplomacy in the area of disarmament, an era that would not have been the same without his presence, an era that is deeply indebted to him and with which his name will always remain associated. Even the present configuration of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, as may be seen in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in our own rules of procedure, owes a great deal to this distinguished and unforgettable figure. The rotating presidency, the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the annual agenda, inter alia, were the result of tireless and effective work.

His contribution to the major problems of international peace and security was not restricted to his work as a distinguished member of the Mexican diplomatic service. He also participated in drafting the San Francisco Charter, he was a brilliant head of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and he was the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East. But this unsurpassed international career cannot lead us to forget that Alfonso Garcia Robles combined this with exceptional human qualities which earned him the respect, admiration and friendship of all who had the privilege of knowing him. As a Venezuelan and a Latin American I wish to add that I feel very proud of the work of this distinguished figure. On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf, I would ask the representative of Mexico to convey to his Government, to Mrs. Garcia Robles, who, with her well-known charm and human touch, was at his side during the course of his

(The President)

exemplary career, and also to his children, our deepest condolences at a loss which affects us greatly. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Shah, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. SHAH (India): I take the floor on behalf of the Group of 21 to perform a sad duty. It is with great shock and a deep sense of sorrow that I and my colleagues in the Group of 21 have learnt of the passing away of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico. Ambassador García Robles had long played such a vital role in the field of multilateral disarmament that his passing away will be a great loss not only to us in G-21 but to the entire international community interested in achieving disarmament.

Ambassador García Robles' career was intimately tied to the multilateral efforts for peace and disarmament and to the work of the United Nations. He contributed to the preparatory work that led to its establishment and vigorously defended, all throughout his life, the principles enshrined in its Charter in every capacity that he held.

Since his appointment in 1967 as head of the Mexican delegation to the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament he devoted a major part of his career to disarmament matters. Earlier, he had brought to a fruitful conclusion the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 1970s, as the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, Ambassador García Robles contributed greatly to developmental issues in addition to his work on disarmament matters. From December 1975, he was appointed Mexico's Minister for Foreign Affairs and served in the Cabinet for almost a year. In 1978, Ambassador García Robles was instrumental in the elaboration of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In 1982, his devotion to the cause of disarmament and his efforts towards that end received the highest recognition when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Alva Myrdal of Sweden.

For more than 20 years Ambassador Alfonso García Robles was the pillar of strength in the work of the Group of first 8 and now 21 non-aligned and neutral States. He came to embody the spirit of our Group. Today, on behalf of the Group of 21 and on my own behalf, we pay our humble but sincere tribute to his memory.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement made on behalf of the Group of 21. I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr. Kenyon, who will do so on behalf of the Western Group.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, the Western Group has asked me to join you and the rest of the Conference in honouring the memory of Dr. Don Alfonso García Robles, who was a tireless worker for arms control and disarmament, the objectives for which this Conference was founded. Many of us move in and out of this kind of work; some stay in it longer than others; but he gave a great part, particularly the latter part of his lifetime, to seeking progress in this area. It is sad that

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

he should pass away at a time when the dam seems to be breaking and we seem to be making more progress in many areas than we have before. I will not enumerate what he did. You did this, and the delegate of India speaking on behalf of the Group of 21 has done that already. I would like to say that my impression of Don Alfonso was that he seemed to combine a dedication and a serenity; I recall that sometimes I would go to him and say, "Given the positions of different delegations, how can you expect us to make any progress on this issue?" And he would smile and say, "One can always hope". And I think hope is a very important thing if one is working in this difficult area. In many ways and in many details we did not share his views as to how to make progress in arms control and disarmament, but we certainly shared his objectives, which were to make this world a safer place for everyone, and I think the best way to honour his memory is probably to redouble our efforts in pursuing those objectives. On behalf of the Western Group, I would join you in asking the delegation of Mexico to pass our condolences to his family.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement on behalf of the Western Group. I now call on the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Tóth, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other States.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Let me say a few words on the sad occasion of the death of the distinguished diplomat of Mexico, His Excellency Mr. Alfonso García Robles, on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was only a year and a half ago that representatives at the Conference on Disarmament bade farewell to a colleague leaving the negotiating body who had left an indelible mark in the history book of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. I do not wish to enumerate his services rendered to the cause of disarmament that are well known to the international community. Mr. García Robles was a unique diplomat, not only because he had devoted more than a quarter of a century of his life and professional career to disarmament but also because of the outstanding achievements that bear the mark of his personal contribution. In spite of great professional successes, he had never been complacent but remained persevering in his quest for a more secure and peaceful world. His untiring efforts were acknowledged when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. A substantial, productive and successful life like his can only be admired and envied. Allow me, through you, Mr. President, to express to his wife and family, and to the delegation, Government and people of Mexico, the deepest sympathy and sorrow of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the passing away of His Excellency Mr. Alfonso García Robles, whose memory will remain with us in the many years to come.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other States. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation learned with deep grief and shock of the death of the former Ambassador of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament and Nobel Prize laureate, Mr. García Robles. This is a colossal loss to the people of Mexico and a loss to the international community. Here in the name of the Chinese delegation I would like to express my deepest condolences to the Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador Bosch, and through him to the Mexican people and Government and to Ambassador Robles' family.

Ambassador Robles was a veteran of international disarmament, an international activist of acclaim. He made commendable and significant contributions to the cause of international disarmament and won respect and acclaim worldwide. Furthermore, Ambassador Robles was a founder of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America, which created the first nuclear-free zone in the world. He made an indelible contribution to the success of the first SSOD and to the formulation of its Final Document. He made firm and unremitting efforts in the restructuring of the multilateral international disarmament forums, including the CD, and the consideration of important disarmament items such as the disarmament decades. Here I would also like to point out that Ambassador Robles was an old friend of the Chinese people. He once paid a visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government and worked for the promotion of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of China and Mexico. We will continue to draw inspiration from the his noble qualities, wisdom, diplomatic skills and contributions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán, who will speak on behalf of the Latin American member and non-member countries participating in the work of the Conference.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): The very special feelings that I might have expressed on behalf of the delegations from Latin America which are members of the Conference on Disarmament and those attending as observers have been very well voiced by the coordinator of the Group of 21. However, we thought it appropriate to add a few words about a man who already appears on the pages of the history of diplomacy as a result of the enormous influence of his personality and approach over more than half a century. As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, as an international civil servant and as a diplomat representing the great nation of Mexico he involved his country and all of Latin America in the struggle for peace, security and development. The untiring efforts of the former dean of the disarmament corps merit broad recognition, as was noted by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly when Don Alfonso García Robles ended his long professional career in the multilateral field. Suffice it to mention, in that regard, that he was the only diplomat who participated in all the disarmament negotiating forums. He was head of his country's delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, as was quite rightly pointed out by the Nobel Committee in setting out the reasons for his being awarded the Peace Prize in

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

1982, his outstanding efforts were significant in opening the eyes of the world to the threat facing mankind with the continuing nuclear arms race. At the regional level, his memory will also be indelible. In his long career he was the architect of a pioneering instrument in the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He was also a pioneer of the process of regional integration who through the search for regional security and its global ramifications, perceived the foundations for the harmonious and integrated development of the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean. We Latin Americans, we who have been his friends and colleagues, and who, as in my own case, have been his disciples, will be unable to forget his tremendous human qualities in addition to his professional skills. Perhaps one of the best tributes that we could pay to his memory is to continue to redouble our efforts to promote the goal of common security through disarmament, through observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the realization of the purposes for which García Robles fought so hard - summarized in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which also includes, as we all know, what we might refer to as the birth certificate of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement on behalf of the Latin American member and non-member countries participating in the work of the Conference. I now invite the Conference to observe a minute's silence in memory of Ambassador D. Alfonso García Robles.

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Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): President Carlos Salinas de Gortari will lead the posthumous tribute to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles to be paid by the people and Government of Mexico in just a few hours in the Foreign Ministry of my country. But this Council chamber was of very special importance and meaning to Don Alfonso, and consequently we wish to express appreciation for everything that has just been said in this forum. We will convey it to our Government and to Mrs. Juanita García Robles and their children.

The professional life of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles covered a turbulent and contradictory half-century. There were ill-fated years and times of hope. In 1938, when he concluded his post-graduate studies in Paris and The Hague, he was invited to give a series of lectures in Europe on a very controversial topic - the reasons for the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. And on the eve of the Second World War, he joined the foreign service. The upheaval was followed by the promise of a better world, and Alfonso García Robles was present at its creation, first at the Latin American level in the Chapultepec conference and subsequently at the San Francisco conference. After a decade as Director of the United Nations Political Division he rejoined our foreign service. He was a delegate

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

to the first conferences on the law of the sea, then Ambassador to Brazil and, as Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs, the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

During the complex negotiations on that Treaty there was an episode that demonstrates his tenacity. In the Mexican Foreign Ministry some wished to abandon the negotiations, and at a particularly difficult time it was hinted to him that perhaps the President shared that view. Under-Secretary García Robles asked to see the President and persuaded him not to give up the undertaking. The Treaty was signed in 1967, the year when he came for the first time to this Conference on Disarmament. He was Permanent Representative in New York from 1970 to 1975, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. From 1977 onwards he devoted himself fully to the work of this Conference. His contribution to disarmament was recognized in 1982 when, together with Ms. Alva Myrdal, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to the Treaty of Tlatelolco he participated actively in the negotiation of the various multilateral instruments in the ENDC and the CCD and in the restructuring of the latter. He played a decisive role in the elaboration of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and was a most enthusiastic promoter of the World Disarmament Campaign and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Certainly he was not always the favourite delegate of the big military Powers, but everyone respected him, particularly his colleagues in what was originally the Group of 8 and is now the Group of 21. I had the good fortune to work with Ambassador García Robles from the first day I joined the foreign service, and I was also fortunate enough to be honoured by his friendship. His personal style can be summed up in a phrase he used often: suaviter in modo, fortiter in re. He was a teacher to several generations of Mexican diplomats and a source of reference and advice for many political leaders of my country. His opinions were well-founded and people listened to him. For him diplomacy was never the art of dissimulation. More than anything else he was the faithful interpreter of the principles of our foreign policy, and thus a good friend of the United Nations and an untiring defender of its noble ideals and purposes. He was an internationalist par excellence and served universal causes loyally.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. We will now move on to outstanding matters that require our attention today. On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Brazil, Chile, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who will take the floor as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to introduce the report of that subsidiary body, and Germany. Before I give him the floor, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to our distinguished visitor today, His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. Ambassador Azambuja needs no introduction. His outstanding work in this Conference as a representative of his country is well remembered and - perhaps it may be appropriate to mention this - many of his wise comments in this negotiating body are still very much with us in our everyday work. Apart from the fact that we are

(The President)

naturally very happy to have him with us again, I am sure that his statement today will be most useful to us in our future undertakings. I call on His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, thank you, and thank you for the very kind and very warm words of welcome. I find myself in the difficult, almost impossible, position of not being able to refer personally to each one of those in this room. I am so close to so many of you; it gives me so much joy and pleasure to see you again that I find it impossible to address to each one of you words of friendship and of encouragement. Let me just say that I am delighted to be here, I am happy to be here and that, in a way, this has become an historic session, not because of what I am going to say, but because of what was said about Alfonso García Robles, to whom I will refer at the end of my statement. But I will read the text I have in front of me, thanking, of course, Mr. Martenson, Mr. Komatina, and all the rest of you for being here.

First of all let me congratulate you on your appointment as President of the Conference on Disarmament. It is my privilege to come back to this plenary, to address the Conference and to see you, my dear friend Ambassador Arteaga, of neighbouring Venezuela, presiding over the work of the Conference in this very important period.

I am grateful to you all for allowing me some time to make this statement on behalf of my Government at this very busy last meeting of the 1991 session, which is dedicated primarily to the final approval of the report to the General Assembly. I couldn't, of course, let pass such a precious opportunity of coming back among old and new friends of the CD and presenting a brief up-date of some Brazilian positions and concerns in the field of disarmament and international security. Before doing so, I would like to touch on a point of special pride and satisfaction to my Government and to myself. As you recall, a little more than a year ago, the delegations of Argentina and Brazil started the practice of making joint statements to the plenary sessions of the Conference. The most recent one was the intervention of my good friend Ambassador García Moritán in relation to our bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signed by Presidents Menem and Collor in Guadalajara in Mexico in July 1991. It is our intention to make joint statements as frequently as possible in the field of disarmament, as we are increasingly doing in other forums, as a testimony of our growing integration and closer identity of views.

I am convinced that the ever deepening understanding between Brazil and Argentina in sensitive areas, such as the nuclear one, will have a positive influence over our region as a whole and to some extent on prevailing attitudes towards cooperation and exchanges in technology, equipment and materials of possible dual use. I need not repeat the expressions of the Ambassador of Argentina in relation to our own nuclear agreement and to the wide-ranging process of integration being carried out between our two countries. May I just stress that our experience in the nuclear field proved that the establishment of appropriate confidence-building mechanisms based on an effective system of cooperation in advanced technologies is a firm path

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

towards enhanced regional security. It is my belief that bilateral and regional understandings of this kind can also be reached in other regions and on a global scale, thus contributing to the cause of a disarmed and secure world.

In the same spirit, I am very pleased to announce that a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons will be signed tomorrow in Mendoza, Argentina, by the Ministers of External Relations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Government of Uruguay will also adhere to this instrument. This very important declaration will reaffirm our formal engagement not to develop, produce, acquire or use those inhumane means of warfare and will also address the question of exports of chemical substances that can be used as precursors for chemical weapons, pending the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. This important collective step in the field of regional security and confidence-building constitutes also a very relevant contribution to international efforts to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. It demonstrates the readiness of our countries to make all efforts to avoid the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the region while at the same time preserving the whole gamut of peaceful uses of science and technology for our economic development and the welfare of our peoples. I am quite sure, incidentally, that Ambassador García Robles would be delighted to hear this announcement were he still in our midst.

As you are aware, Argentina and Brazil presented recently to the UNDC a proposal for the multilateral consideration of criteria related to the transfer of "sensitive" technologies. We are jointly taking the initiative of promoting the discussion of that subject in the next session of the General Assembly. We would be very interested that many more delegations could react to the document presented to the UNDC, as some representatives of industrialized countries already did, such as Ambassador Gérard Errera, of France.

The recent events in our fast-changing world demonstrated that improved mechanisms are needed to prevent threats to international security. In the perspective of countries like Brazil, such mechanisms, stringent as they may be, should not impose additional barriers to technology access, which is essential for our development. In other words, many difficulties are faced because of the lack of predictable, clear and universally applicable rules for the transfer of dual-use technology.

About two years ago, when I was the representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, I stated that - and I am quoting myself - "verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century". I am very glad to see today that many countries seem to share those views. Proposals were presented aiming at the establishment of a verification regime for a nuclear test ban; measures to strengthen the biological weapons Convention may also be examined at the forthcoming review conference of that Convention, to take place over the next weeks in Geneva. Another evidence of the importance of this subject is the careful attention it received in this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

With regard to the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention, the delegation of Brazil is instructed to contribute, as effectively as possible, to the achievement of the objective of concluding the draft next year. As to the verification regime of the convention, it is our hope that an efficient mechanism is established so that we avoid the creation of a cumbersome and costly organization. Likewise, it seems convenient to avoid unnecessary interference with the civilian industrial activities in our countries. In this sense, we considered as a positive step the offer made by the industry representatives, when they met in Geneva last June, that they would be prepared to accept inspections any time anywhere. Serious consideration should be given to that offer, for it could enable the adoption of random inspections in civil chemical facilities, thus allowing for a simple and less costly mechanism that could, at the same time, serve the verification purposes of the convention.

I also think that an appropriate regime of inspections on request could contribute to our aim. More transparency could be obtained if all countries would accept the concept of inspections on request to their chemical facilities, without the right to refusal. I could not envisage a more transparent and non-discriminatory regime, which could at the same time reduce the number of routine inspections and the costs of the future organization.

Negotiations are starting, I understand, in connection with the composition and functions of the executive council of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is of utmost interest to my country that an acceptable agreement is reached that allows for balanced representation of regions, political groups and countries, also taking into account the importance of the chemical industry in the overall context.

It seems to me that after a chemical weapons convention is in force with its verification regime in operation, countries applying other controls and restrictions to international transfers of dual-use chemicals and facilities should suspend them. On the other hand, it would enhance the convention regime and promote universal adherence if reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 could be formally withdrawn when the convention comes into force.

We would receive with great appreciation a formal renunciation by all Latin American countries of all weapons of mass destruction. In our region, more precisely in South America, which is recognized to be the least armed region in the world, economic and social problems are an essential part of collective security. That is why we have to tackle poverty-related questions and request international cooperation to improve our economies and ensure the necessary technology transfers.

At this moment, we are negotiating the chemical weapons convention with renewed enthusiasm, thanks to the positive evolution in the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which permitted the adoption of an unconditional prohibition of chemical weapons in article I of the draft convention. But besides chemical weapons we continued to debate on important items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, I would like to note the new dimension given to the consideration of item 1, Nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

The President of Brazil has welcomed the conclusion of the START Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR as a very important step towards nuclear disarmament. In his communications to Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, President Collor recalled that Brazil had renounced non-peaceful uses of atomic energy and he expressed the hope that the bilateral treaty brings new momentum in the process towards ever decreasing thresholds of nuclear arms, bearing in mind the long-term objective of complete nuclear disarmament and the ban on all types of weapons of mass destruction.

Countries not possessing weapons of mass destruction and having declared the intention of not developing such weapon systems have the right to receive, at the very least, assurances that those will never be used against them. We hope all weapons of mass destruction can be destroyed in the not very distant future and that the countries having such capability renounce once and for all resorting to the improvement of their weapons and to the development of new and more sophisticated ones.

Recent events in the world are proving the need for enhanced collective security measures. Important proposals in this area were put forward after the recent Gulf crisis. Brazil is giving attentive consideration to all proposals that may lead to global disarmament. We all know that whenever multilateral disarmament negotiations are involved renewed efforts will be required on the part of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that this Conference will not frustrate the expectations regarding the role it has to play in this disarmament effort. For my part, I can assure you that Brazil will be committed to new universal and non-discriminatory disarmament understandings to which negotiations of this Conference may lead.

In my final words I would like to pay tribute to an old friend, Ambassador García Robles, from whom I learned so much. I very much regret his death and I am sure that all of us will miss him in the Conference on Disarmament. I will never forget the outstanding performance of this brilliant Ambassador of Mexico, since those distant days when he was the leader of the Mexican delegation and I a junior member of the delegation of Brazil to the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I am honoured to occupy now his place at the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Ambassador García Robles was a model for all diplomats working in the field of international security and disarmament. I hope Ambassador Marín Bosch will convey to Mrs. Juanita García Robles and to the boys my deeply felt sentiments.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil for his important statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Mr. González.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is particularly pleased to address the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when its work is being presided over by a distinguished and

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experienced Ambassador of Venezuela, a country with which we have historical ties of friendship that have been forged from the dawn of Latin American independence.

Today, the Conference on Disarmament is concluding its 1991 session. We think that this is an appropriate time to assess the work done during these last few months, particularly from our standpoint as a non-member of the Conference. It is therefore our intention to highlight the positive and negative aspects thereof, constantly guided by a genuine constructive spirit.

First of all we must note the renewed impetus of the negotiations for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons once and for all, to the extent that it is no longer illusory to think that the work on this matter can be finalized during the course of next year. The extension of the negotiating mandate, the progress made on vital articles such as articles I and II and the intensive discussions on verification and challenge inspection are tangible examples of this. This is solely the result of the flexibility shown by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in withdrawing their proposals on maintaining a percentage of their stockpiles and on the right to retaliate. We are therefore witnessing a clear case where bilateral initiatives, far from replacing multilateralism, strengthen it in a constructive fashion, so that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole negotiating body in the United Nations system, can attain its important goals.

Chile, like the entire international community, is convinced of the imperative need to conclude as soon as possible an agreement banning the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. In previous statements and in its response to the outline for the exchange of basic data proposed by Germany, it has clearly reiterated that it does not produce nor does it intend to produce this type of weapon, as I wish to reaffirm on this occasion. In that respect, and in order to show the determination guiding us in these areas, I am pleased to announce in this Conference that my country has initiated domestic legislative procedures for the withdrawal of the reservations entered by Chile when it ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The step that we have taken in this field is, as we see it, a sign of our faith in the results achieved in the negotiations to which I have referred, and also a measure aimed at increasing international and regional trust. We are encouraged to note that several States that had entered similar reservations are prepared to adopt similar measures and we appeal to those that have not yet done so to do likewise so that at the signing of the convention on chemical weapons there will be no reservations to the Geneva Protocol. It is also a particular pleasure for my Government to announce that, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil has already said, tomorrow, 5 September, in the city of Mendoza, together with Argentina and Brazil, a joint declaration will be signed on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, which is clear evidence of the political will which spurs our countries on in our efforts to create real conditions for peace and international stability. At the same time, we particularly welcome the fact that the Government of Uruguay will be joining in that commitment and

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we hope that many other countries will do the same. In this respect the Mendoza agreement, in addition to reaffirming the various unilateral declarations on the non-possession of chemical weapons, refers to the decision to cooperate closely to expedite the conclusion of the convention and to sign it simultaneously as original parties, as well as the intention to institute appropriate measures to monitor substances defined as precursors of chemical warfare agents and the study of mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance with the commitment entered into, until such time as the future convention comes into force. In a similar area, readiness is expressed to look into systems that would help to strengthen the verification machinery under the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Finally, the hope is expressed that other States of the region will endorse the content of this declaration.

It is clear that in various bodies and forums, Latin America is taking major, effective steps forward as regards disarmament problems, arms control and the creation of a climate of mutual trust as expressed in agreements such as the Mendoza agreement, which contribute indirectly but in a meaningful way to strengthening true security based on the elimination of conflict scenarios and their replacement by the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. In this connection, Chile attaches great importance to regional confidence-building measures, and in this respect has noted with interest the initiative launched by the President of Peru for the holding in Lima next November of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Rio Group aimed at beginning studies and exchanges of views for the purpose of reaching agreement on limiting conventional military arsenals involving high-technology weapons, as well as other matters deemed to be of interest.

As this Conference prepares to adopt a new report to be submitted to the General Assembly containing a summary of the debates and progress made in its subsidiary bodies during this period, allow me to refer to the statement made in this very room on 8 February 1990 by the then representative of Brazil, who, happily, is with us today, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, who is now Secretary-General in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With great vision he said:

> "Unless we effectively broaden our working agenda, this Conference could shrink to no more than a de facto preparatory committee for the future convention on chemical weapons, and only later seek new missions to accomplish. This is a minimalist approach and one that falls far short of the expectations of the international community, one that would make a mockery of our many declarations and resolutions and one fraught with the danger of the long agony of a progressively more enfeebled negotiating body."

He went on to add that "the time has come for aggressively creative new thinking, and ... we have 'in-house' the ability and the experience to suggest ways and means for our renewal and for enduring perhaps even greater usefulness in a dramatically altered international political environment."

(Mr. González, Chile)

These words, uttered at the beginning of the 1990 session, are equally relevant as this session ends, and we consider that they can offer food for lengthy reflection by the delegations present here with next year's session in mind. In fact if we analyse the results achieved by the ad hoc committees in the past few months, we can easily reach the conclusion that apart from matters relating to chemical weapons, the remaining topics on the agenda, despite the efforts of many of their chairmen, were considered superficially and therefore progress has not been substantial, as this mandate of a negotiating body entitled us to expect. This is simply the logical outcome of the existence of working groups that do not have the essential negotiating mandate and therefore have to confine themselves to compiling statements and a variety of background material.

My delegation is very much aware of the need to give priority to work on chemical weapons and supports that decision, but it cannot go along with the idea of postponing all the other items in such a way as to convert this Conference into a preparatory conference for the chemical weapons convention. That is why we recognize the great value of the initiative recently submitted by Sweden in document CD/1089, containing a revised version of its own draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had been submitted in 1983. We believe that that initiative is a useful and timely contribution which has come at a time when the Committee in question, like several others, is stagnating because of a lack of political will to deal with substantive matters. We would therefore venture to propose that among the measures studied annually by the Conference for improving its functioning, we should include next year the permanent establishment of the ad hoc committees with clear-cut and well-defined mandates, so that it is not necessary to devote long weeks each year to discussing how they should be re-established.

With respect to the question of participation by observers, this year the Conference decided as a measure aimed at bringing about improvement that interested countries would not have to indicate which subsidiary bodies they wished to attend and that their seating in this room would rotate. Without going into the pros and cons of these decisions, which we consider merely procedural, I only wish to point out that these measures were agreed without consulting the countries directly involved, that is, the observers. It is an established custom in this Conference that thorough consultations are held before any decision is adopted. However, in this instance which affects non-member States, no one took the initiative of consulting them. In our case, had we been consulted, we would have indicated that if the aim is to facilitate participation by observers, the matter should be studied in a broader fashion, including matters such as requests for participation not having to be renewed annually, and observer countries also being able to be present during informal meetings of the plenary.

The foregoing leads me to wonder whether, in the current period on the international stage, which has witnessed the collapse not just of walls but of the most solidly built authoritarian systems, accompanied by the renewal of the democratic spirit and a willingness for dialogue, this Conference is adjusting to the new times by acting in a transparent fashion. Unfortunately our response to this basic concern is negative, as despite many fervent

(Mr. González, Chile)

statements in this room we have not really seen any substantive changes, and everything continues as if the world remained divided into two irreconcilable blocs. If some delegations suspect exaggeration, then what is the explanation for the fact that after more than six years the Conference has still not been able to resolve the question of its expansion? How can one understand that, at a time when the political scenario has changed radically and the problems which arose in the past have been overcome, it is now that claims are made that dealing with this topic could lead to the dangerous politicization of the Conference? Could expansion by four, five or six new members really endanger the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, or would it on the contrary help to reflect greater universality in respect of the rest of the international community on a matter which is naturally of universal scope? It is not our intention to repeat now the decisive arguments put forward in this room by the distinguished Ambassador of Spain just a few months ago on this same point, but I do wish to say that as an observer country and candidate for membership of the Conference, we fully share his concerns and hope that the period of recess that is now beginning will serve as an incentive for all the parties to deal decisively with this matter which has been with us for such a long time.

I would not wish to conclude these words without expressing my gratitude once again to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, for the interest and understanding that he showed in submitting a specific proposal, which in our opinion constitutes a basis for negotiation, gratitude which is also due to all the other ambassadors who have presided over the Conference during the course of this year and thus held informal consultations on the same point. We think that because of its importance and sensitiveness, the study of the matter of expansion next year should be separated from that of improving the effectiveness of the Conference, so that one or if possible a group of coordinators could deal with it in a firm and decisive manner. We will also raise this matter in our statement within the framework of the First Committee of the General Assembly. We also wish to thank the many delegations that actively supported us in the Group of 21 in order that interested observer delegations should be able to participate with the same status in its expanded discussions. Unfortunately the consensus rule enabled the small number of delegations that objected to this step to block its introduction, but we trust that the pause for thought that they themselves sought will lead to an early and successful conclusion for the purpose of showing that the non-aligned countries are able and prepared to initiate the transparency and democracy so sorely needed in this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Batsanov, who in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will introduce the report of that subsidiary body, contained in document CD/1108.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Sir. You have given me the floor in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, I must at the outset ask for your forgiveness and say a few words in my national capacity. I would like to say that as the representative of the Soviet Union and as someone who has worked in, I think, all the diplomatic posts within the Soviet delegation to this Conference, I am extremely grieved at the unwelcome and untimely death of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles. I had the good fortune to know him for quite a long period of time, first of all as one of the junior officials in the Soviet delegation, and then I was fortunate enough to be his colleague here in the Conference, and on every occasion I could not help admiring the way he operated, his tenacity and also his extraordinary capacity to find ways out of situations which allowed the positions of the parties involved in the discussion - very often this included the Mexican side - to be duly respected. So I would like to endorse what was said by my coordinator, Ambassador Toth, and his request for our profound condolences to be conveyed to the Mexican people, and Government, and the relatives of the deceased, and truly I am deeply moved by this event.

Now, if I may, I will move on to introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1108. It was adopted by our Committee on 27 August. As in previous years, the report consists of three parts: the technical part, appendix I, containing the text of the draft convention, and appendix II, containing material for further work. It can be said without exaggeration that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1991 has taken on a completely new character. The stage has been passed where many doubted it was possible to rapidly conclude the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee have now entered a new, more advanced stage. This is reflected, inter alia, in the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

On 20 June, further to its decision of 14 February to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament added to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. The scope of the future convention was expanded to include a fundamental obligation, that of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Committee was instructed to intensify the negotiations "with a view to striving to achieve a final agreement on the convention by 1992". In pursuance of this decision the Ad Hoc Committee has already conducted an additional session of limited duration from 8 to 19 July 1991, and I must add that this was a rather productive session. In this context, I would like to draw the attention of delegates to the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation that it should continue work on the draft convention until the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons by the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, except for three periods: 9 to 27 September; 14 October to 15 November; and 23 December to 3 January 1992. However, even during those periods, in the view of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Chairman and the members of the bureau should hold active private consultations to prepare the ground for the work of the Committee. There will also be a meeting of experts on technical aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons from 7 to 11 October.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

I would now like to dwell briefly on the principal results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee over the past year. Even a cursory glance at the text of the draft convention introduced today will indicate the substantial body of new material which has been included in the draft convention as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year. Once again we have a very large document, 225 pages long, at least in the Russian version, but that is not the point; the point is that we have quite a few really new provisions in the draft convention, new important provisions. I am referring first and foremost to the provisions forming the core of the future convention on the prevention of chemical weapons, on which we were unable to arrive at a solution over a long period. I am talking about the issues included in the "security basket". On the basis of the results of work this year, article I of the draft convention now contains an obligation for States parties "never under any circumstances to use chemical weapons". The issue of the mandatory 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities has also been finally resolved. Article X on assistance and protection against chemical weapons and article XIII on "Relation to other international agreements" have also been included in the draft. And I would particularly like to stress that in these articles there are no unagreed provisions at all. Also included in the draft convention are article XI on economic and technological development, article XII on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and article XVI on settlement of disputes. Efforts to finalize the text of these three articles will of course be continued.

The Ad Hoc Committee had at the centre of its attention issues related to machinery for verifying compliance with the provisions of the convention. This relates to both verification under article VI, "Activities not prohibited under the Convention", as well as challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections under article IX. The results of the work done on article VI are reflected in the document submitted today. Although there are certain conceptual differences of view concerning the scope of verification in civil commerical industry, the work that has been done makes it possible to state that there are realistic prospects for a compromise solution. Many interesting proposals and suggestions have been put forward on the problem of solving the issue of challenge inspections. Intensive consultations on this subject have been conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman. Here again we should note a desire on the part of all participants in the negotiations to work seriously in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise. After intensive consultations during our work this year it has also been possible to make distinct progress on the important issue of the use of terms "jurisdiction and control" in the text of the convention. New provisions in this regard are reflected in articles I, III, IV, V and VI. In addition, extensive work has been done in all the groups to "clean up" a large number of articles in the draft convention.

At the end of the summer session, or rather the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, as it is now known, the Ad Hoc Committee began discussions on the issue of the composition of and decision-making procedure in the executive council to be established under the convention. There is no need to stress how important the settlement of this issue is. Of

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

course, serious work will be needed here, and we will need to do our utmost to reduce our differences on this subject. It would not seem to be a wise idea to postpone a final decision on the whole complex of problems concerning the executive council until the very end of work on the draft convention. Important issues which we still have to deal with in the near future are questions relating to the financing of the future organization and its structure. The recent specific proposals which have been put forward on this subject are of interest and deserve in-depth study.

The considerable progress achieved on the multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made possible thanks to the efforts made by all participants in the negotiations, including the 37 States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament, and their desire to seek mutually acceptable compromise solutions, their readiness to devote maximum attention, regardless of the time required, to moving work on the Convention forward as fast as possible. I can safely state that the groundwork for the present progress was largely laid by my predecessors as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and by all the many years of painstaking work on the draft convention. Of course, we still have much to do in order to complete the work on the convention next year.

In submitting the report I must express my warmest thanks to the chairmen of the three working groups, Mr. Mashhadi from Iran, Mr. Gizowsky from Poland and Mr. Perugini from Italy. I was also helped in my work by the friends of the Chair, Ambassadors Loeis and Brotodiningrat from Indonesia, Mr. Meerburg, the Netherlands and Mr. Canonne, France. The members of the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons did all they could to help move ahead with work on the draft convention. Enormous work was also done by Mrs. Rautio, Finland, in the Group on Analytical Database and Laboratories. We may rightly consider this work as practical preparation for the operation of the future organization. On behalf of the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons I would also like to take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for organizing the visit to The Hague, where the Government of the Netherlands proposes to locate the headquarters of the future organization under the convention. Allow me also to thank the Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, his deputy, Ms. Hoppe, and their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, and to note their great professionalism and invaluable assistance in our work. I would also like to extend our appreciation to the interpreters and translators as well as all the technical personnel who contributed to the effectiveness and proper organization of our work.

As I have already said, in approving its report to the Conference on Disarmament, our Ad Hoc Committee is not in any way preparing to wind down its work. Quite the contrary - this year the "inter-sessional period" promises to be especially busy. So please do not be surprised at my next statement: if the Conference agrees with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Committee's next meeting will be held on [illegible]

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

And the final point: in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee there is no reference to anybody being recommended for the post of Chairman for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. In fact, I don't know, maybe a shorter term of office than mine awaits the future Chairman. At all events, there is no such recommendation, and that is because when we adopted the report last week in the Ad Hoc Committee, we did not yet have a candidate we could include in the report. However, I am now delighted to inform you and officially report that we have consensus to the effect that Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador and representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, is recommended as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced, and I am expressing the shared view of all the participants in the CW negotiations, that this is a fine choice. We know the distinguished Ambassador von Wagner as an experienced CW negotiator. This year he had a heavy burden on his shoulders as the Western Group's coordinator on chemical weapons, and I think we can be certain that he will be a fine Chairman for next year. Therefore, on my own behalf, and on behalf of the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee, I would like to congratulate Ambassador von Wagner, so to speak, on his forthcoming designation as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in January, of course. On the basis of my own experience, I could at the same time express some commiseration with him. But that is what his destiny is now going to be. Yet again I congratulate him and express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will endorse our report, the report of our Ad Hoc Committee.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list. I suggest that we move on to adopt decisions on those ad hoc committee reports that have yet to be approved. We will do so following the order of their introduction in plenary. We will begin with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, contained in document CD/1106. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We move on to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which appears in document CD/1105. As there are no objections, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We are now to adopt document CD/1108, containing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. If there are no objections, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to the

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): I take the floor on behalf of the Western Group as their CW Coordinator to express our gratitude through you, Mr. President, to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov. He has guided the Ad Hoc Committee with great wisdom, sensitivity and patience, as witnessed by the report we have just adopted.

With the exception of the "challenge" part of article IX, for the first time in CW negotiating history, all the elements of a complete draft convention are on the table in the Ad Hoc Committee. This has become possible due to important progress achieved during the past 24 negotiation weeks plus two inter-sessional weeks. I shall abstain from repeating the different points which I had originally listed in my manuscript since Ambassador Batsanov has just alluded to them so eloquently. Remaining problems, however, must be mentioned and should not be underestimated. Although there seems to be general support for a graduated "managed access" approach, the discussion on challenge inspections so far hints at major negotiation difficulties concerning the role of the executive council as well as other issues. On the question of verification of chemical industry we need to find a cost-effective and practicable system, balancing breadth of coverage with protection of legitimate industrial activity. Provisions concerning trade with CW-related chemicals for peaceful purposes will not be an easy problem to solve. Against that, the composition and the functions of the executive council seem to be questions which - once political decisions are taken - could be solved rather quickly. Destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons urgently needs in-depth consideration. Lastly, on the issue of universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention, important proposals are still on the agenda.

All these problems are solvable. The groundwork has been laid. The details - in which, according to a well-known proverb, the devil sits - can be worked out. What the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee need is the determination of delegations to do so. Governments and delegations must be aware of the enormous gain in security which could be registered for all States through a well-verified and reliable chemical weapons convention. If delegations have forgotten the risk which otherwise would exist, they should remember the war between Iraq and Iran as well as the recent Gulf war - wars which are almost unimaginable in some other regions of the world.

Each international legal instrument involves the acceptance of certain obligations and restrictions. In the case of the chemical weapons convention the price of such acceptance is made worthwhile not only by security gains but also by the creation of a climate of confidence in which international cooperation and peaceful trade in chemicals can prosper. Let's be realistic: the overall balance is extremely positive. Let's draw the right conclusions from this assessment and establish the CW convention by May 1992.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

you mentioned me, whether it would be appropriate from a protocol point of view to mention what I wanted to say, and I came to the conclusion that probably it was not appropriate, but since you, in your wisdom and you, Mr. Chairman, in yours, have mentioned me, I will just tell you that I am deeply moved and that I am very grateful mainly to the Western Group delegations who have given me the honour of being their candidate for the post of Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, and to you who have endorsed this nomination.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement. We have thus completed consideration of the reports of the subsidiary bodies. It now falls to us to adopt the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly contained in documents CD/WP.409, 409/Corr.1, and 411 and the Rev.1 versions of documents CD/WP.412 to 415, with the changes introduced orally in the informal meeting. The secretariat will fill in the blank spaces and dotted lines in the texts containing the draft report. As usual the final text of the annual report will incorporate the reports of the five ad hoc committees that were established in 1991. I now put before the Conference for adoption the draft annual report contained in the documents I have just mentioned. Does any delegation wish to take the floor before we adopt the report? The representative of Mongolia has the floor.

Mr. GONGOR (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation regrets the footnote to paragraph 12 of the draft report (document CD/WP.409 and Corr.1), which is not in keeping with the decision adopted earlier by the Conference on the expansion of the membership of the Conference whilst maintaining a proper balance. The Mongolian delegation considers that such a footnote can only be made on questions of the substance of the work of the Conference this year, and not in reference to a decision adopted earlier.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement, which we have duly noted. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Does any delegation wish to take the floor now? I suggest that we move on to another matter. Under rule 7 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, we are required to set the actual dates for the three parts of the 1992 session. I propose the following dates: Tuesday 21 January to Friday 27 March for the first part; Monday 11 May to Friday 26 June for the second part; and Monday 20 July to Thursday 3 September for the third part. Of course, it is understood that these dates do not prejudge any decision that the Conference may adopt, should it be necessary, on additional work during the breaks between the first and second

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I will now make my closing statement as President of the Conference.

We have come to the conclusion of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I may say that this year's work in this forum has been stimulated by the new international climate of dialogue, openness and cooperation prevailing among nations, major agreements in the field of arms control and other initiatives aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime. At the start of what could be an era of new opportunities, at the beginning of history instead of the end as it has been called, the international community should encourage a renewed commitment to, and the strengthening of, the peace and security mechanisms created under the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, at present, when we speak of a new world order - when, under unprecedented circumstances, conditions exist for promoting understanding, solidarity and just international relations - there is a need for efforts to replace old approaches aiming at absolute security by structures based on common security. In this context the Disarmament Conference has a significant contribution to make. In this Conference we have noted a considerable shift towards positions that are more constructive and conciliatory. I think that what could be and I hope will be an auspicious trend should encourage future progress in achieving agreements on the various topics on our agenda.

When I began my term of office as President of the Conference on Disarmament, I highlighted the progress made in the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention. Today, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who is chairing the work of that Committee with great skill, submitted the report on its work, which is a clear reflection of the progress achieved. Mention should be made of the improvements in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as in various relevant articles, through the inclusion of specific provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and guarantees with respect to their total destruction, as well as the decision to include various articles in the text of the draft convention. Article X, on assistance and protection against the use of chemical weapons, is particularly important, as well as article XI on economic and technological development. The Ad Hoc Committee will continue to work during the inter-sessional period, so as to give impetus to the negotiations with a view to final agreement on the convention in 1992. I also wish to express our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for their invitation to visit The Hague. We are giving very serious consideration to the offer of the Government of that country to host the headquarters of the future chemical weapons organization.

This year, too, useful work has been done on the nuclear test ban, which is a topic of vital importance. We are all aware of the difficulties which existed in the past as regards re-establishing the Committee on this item. In the 1990 session the decision on its re-establishment was adopted perhaps

(The President)

positions and proposals submitted. It is to be hoped that the Committee will continue its work, taking into account the ground already covered as well as the need to channel its work towards an objective that is essential and cannot be deferred - the establishment of a complete nuclear test ban.

Another area that will require additional effort by the Conference is that relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year has been fairly fruitful, allowing more appropriate and in-depth analysis of the aspects relating to this topic. A good number of proposals have been submitted on measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, and this should encourage the Committee to step up its efforts to achieve concrete agreements.

It is clear that efforts aimed at improving the functioning of the work of this Conference have not yet been exhausted. In consultations various aspects relating to this topic were taken up, in what has been a very useful exercise which should be continued. More time and reflection will also be required to give due consideration to the topic of the expansion of the membership of the Conference - a topic which is of course of incontestable importance.

Many constructive statements have been made in plenary meetings during this year, some of them from distinguished figures. Another factor that deserves mention is the active participation in this Conference by observer countries, which have made a positive contribution to our work. As we round off the work of this session, we can see that the role that this forum is destined to play is more pertinent than ever. Consequently, we should endeavour to live up to the challenges and demands posed by the present times, in keeping with the interest and the trust which the international community has placed in this Conference, whose credibility needs to be enhanced. Let us make good use of the experience we have gained and the results of our work to generate the necessary political impetus that will enable us to rise to achieve the concrete and higher objectives that justified the establishment of this multilateral negotiating body.

Today we have adopted the report of the Conference on Disarmament for 1991, which I will present to the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This report is a faithful reflection of intensive work and the spirit of cooperation shown. I wish to thank sincerely all those who have participated in this task, and I would urge them to continue in this same constructive spirit in the future. Once again, I wish to thank my predecessors for the efficient manner in which they presided over the work of the Conference throughout the course of this year, and also the chairmen of the various committees that were set up for their talents and great dedication in carrying out their responsibilities. I wish to express my deep gratitude to all the secretariat and conference services staff, particularly Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General, and

(The President)

and diligent efforts of the secretariat, it would have been impossible for the Conference to discharge its tasks fully. We also wish to thank the team of interpreters and translators, who have given us invaluable support in our work.

I have now concluded my closing statement, and I wish to report to you that I have no other business to take up before the closure of the work of the Conference. It remains to remind you that, in keeping with the decision adopted today by the Conference with respect to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, that subsidiary body will continue its work during the inter-sessional period in keeping with the recommendation in paragraph 16, subparagraphs (c) and (d) of the above-mentioned report.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 21 January 1992 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.